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PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES:
PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONALIZATION
J. Jeffery Auer
One hundred twenty-five years ago, Abraham Lincoln became president
of the United States after defeating Stephen Douglas in the election of 1860.
The two candidates never met in presidential debates, but they had debated
each other in seven central Illinois towns during the senatorial campaign of
1858, The idea of debating emerged as the candidates, contesting for a
Senate seat, were addressing voters who would elect members of the state
legislature who would in turn elect the senator. In that event, Lincoln chal
lenged Douglas to the debates; and Douglas claimed as the incumbent the
right to set the terms. Thus, he made the opening and closing speeches in
four debates; and Lincoln did the same in three. Each man spoke for ninety
minutes: the opener for sixty minutes; his opponent for ninety minutes,
combining refutation and argument; and then the opener again, closing
with a thirty-minute rebuttal.
The two men were in direct confrontation on the platform. They ad
dressed each other as well as the audience; they questioned each other;
each refuted the other's arguments; and they stayed pretty well on the
single issue of the future of slavery in the territories. The nub of the matter,
you may recall, was the series of direct questions put to Douglas by Lincoln
in establishing the Freeport Dilemma. Douglas was forced to choose be
tween repudiating the Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision, which had
declared illegal any action by the voters to prohibit slavery in the territories,
and repudiating his own cherished doctrine of Popular Sovereignty. Ret
rospectively, it is agreed that Douglas won the 1858 debate—at the price
of losing the 1860 election.
In any case, these are the facts from which has grown one of America's
most cherished political myths: that competing candidates' direct interro
gation of each other and direct clashing over ideas, assumptions, evidence,
and argument are healthy experiences for the debaters and are especially
good for the electors. This is the mythic heritage of the Lincoln-Douglas
debates.
1 suggest that the sharp confrontation aspect of the Lincoln-Douglas myth
has been reinforced by another myth of equal vintage. Just a few months
before Lincoln's election in 1860, the first of the dime novels was published.
J. jeffery Auer is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Speech Com
munication, Indiana University. This document is a transcript of a speech he
delivered at the Central States Speech Association Convention, Indianapolis,
on 5 April 1985 (copyright 1985). His earlier article, "Great Debate about
the Great Debates," was published in Speaker and Gavel 18 (Winter 1981);
14-21.
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2  SPEAKER AND GAVEL
It was an adventure yarn, based in the Wild West and featuring a cowboy
as its hero, in time, the mythic backwoodsman heroes, like Daniel Boone,
and the mythic mountain man heroes, like Kit Carson, gave way to the
mythical cowboy, like Owen Wister's "The Virginian," like Hopalong Gas-
sidy, or like any of Zane Grey's heroes. For most of us, that mythical cowboy
doubtless lives most memorably in the movie character portrayed by Gary
Cooper in 1952. He was the chief lawman of Hadleyville, Marshal Will Kane,
who confronted the outlaw, Frank Miller, in a shoot-out on the deserted,
dusty main steet at "High Noon." This cowboy myth always pits a noble
hero who lives by the "code of the West" against a villain who desecrates
that code. The inevitable resolution of justice is in a lonely one-to-one
confrontation, a sanctified shoot-out. And this method parallels the Lincoln-
Douglas tradition of political resolution by one-to-one debate.
In his recent book Myth and Meaning (1983), Stephen Ausband argues that
most of the traditions that make up our myths have the effect of imposing
some order and stability into our national self-perceptions. In my view, the
twin myths of the Lincoln-Douglas confrontation and the "Cowboy at High
Noon" have contributed to our self-perception the idea that we are a peo
ple who resolve our questions about public men and measures by such
reasonable procedures as presidential debates. So let us hear no more about
Sander Vanocur's judgment that the Carter-Ford debate was "an unnatural
act between two consenting adults in public."
In his constant and often inconsequential grasp for a laugh line, Ronald
Reagan would probably begin a retrospective look at presidential debates
by saying that he was in the audience for Lincoln and Douglas. I must confess
that I was not. However, I did hear the 1948 nationally broadcasted radio
debate of candidates Harold Stassen and Thomas Dewey in the Oregon
primary, the 1956 nationally televised debate of Adiai Stevenson and Estes
Kefauver in the Florida primary, and the 1960 widely televised debate of
Jack Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey in the West Virginia primary. Buoyed
by these experiences, and ever-optimistic, I was one of many in the speech
communication community who urged that party convention nominees—
not just candidates in state primaries—quadrennially take part in public
debates, presumably in the mythic style of Lincoln-Douglas and the "Cow
boy at High Noon."
In retrospect, when we asked for public presidential debates, what did
we get in 1960, 1976, 1980, and 1984? In the first place, we wedded the
debates to television. As Professor David Swanson said in a distinguished
lecture to an Indiana University audience just a few days ago, contemporary
political communication has become "The Living-Room War." So it was with
the first debates between Kennedy and Nixon in 1960: in living rooms and
in barrooms all over the country, individuals and small groups gathered in
front of their television screens. Like the citizens of Hadleyville, who peeked
from behind closed doors to watch Marshal Will Kane and outlaw Frank
Miller, we peered at our screens to see and hear our political version of
the "white hat" versus the "black hat."
Whatever else may be said about this first experience, which NBC board
chairman Frank Stanton was apparently the first to call "The Great Debate,"
it was clearly an epic event. Although the debate was staged as a public
6
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affairs program, the concern for stage setting, lighting, candidates' makeup,
and camera angles indicated it was obviously viewed as a show. Young Rich
ard Nixon was momentarily gulled by the event when he wrote in 1962 in
Six Crises that presidential debates "are here to stay ... the candidates have
a responsibility to inform the public on their views before the widest pos
sible audience." But in his Memoirs, the mature Nixon reflected on his
thoughts after having heard the Ford-Carter debates of 1976: "I doubt that
they can ever serve a responsible role in defining the issues of a presidential
campaign. Because of the nature of the medium," he concluded, "there
will inevitably be a greater premium on showmanship than on statesman
ship." After the Carter-Reagan debates in 1980, Nixon repeated his char
acterization of the "show business medium" and concluded that "more
often than not, what is emotionally appealing—and therefore dramatically
captivating—is intellectually vacuous and substantively wrong. What makes
good television," he said, "often makes bad policy."
The fact is, of course, that in national politics, much more than at state
and local levels, television provides the primary access to the voters. As
Walter Mondale realistically observed in a press conference the day after
the 1984 election, "I think that, more than ! was able to do, modern politics
today requires a mastery of television.... I don't believe it's possible any
more to run for president without the capacity to build confidence and
communications every night. It's got to be done that way."
Mondale's comments came in an expression of candor, not recrimination.
"I think you know," he told the reporters, "I've never really warmed up to
television. And in fairness to television, it's never really warmed up to me.
I like to look someone in the eye and say it and listen, and there's something
about that that I've never been comfortable with and I think it's obvious."
Indeed, any communication critic would agree with Mondale, both in as
sessing his own television limitations and in projecting the necessity for
future candidates to be what I would call television-congenial.
Being a television-congenial candidate means more than just showing a
pleasant personality. Not only does it require effective delivery techniques,
like Reagan's "Aw, shucks" manner and his management of his voice, facial
expressions, and gestures; it also requires invention and arrangement. Care
ful study of what speech writers do for presidents and for presidential can
didates in the television age reveals an increase in the generality of argu
ments and the universality of proofs. Benjamin Page found, in his 1978 study
Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections, that the most common charac
teristic of presidential candidates' speeches in the sixties and seventies was
ambiguity. It Is, of course. In the choice of words that the appeal to "Every
man" is reflected. Roderick Hart's splendid pioneer computer-based anal
ysis Verbal Style and the Presidency (1984) makes this clear. For example, he
states that "Ronald Reagan is a semantic egalitarian who resolutely insists
that no philosophical concept is so subtle that it cannot be turned into a
political slogan. In this sense," I am delighted to quote Hart, "Ronald Reagan
is the Mortimer Adler of American politics."
Let me conclude these observations about the wedding of presidential
debates to national television by citing Henry Fairlie, England's gift to Amer
ican journalism. Just a few days ago, in the New Republic, Fairlie reported
7
et al.: Complete Issue 24(1)
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 1986
4  SPEAKER AND GAVEL
that the editor of The Washingtonian had said that an article ought to be
written that described what the world would be like if suddenly there were
no television. As Fairlie immediately responded, "For one thing, there would
be no elections. We have forgotten how to hold elections without televi
sion."
On to my second contention: when we wedded the debates to televi
sion, we created media events; but these events were not in the true Lin
coln-Douglas at high noon tradition. Now, media event is not necessarily a
pejorative term. It can, for example, emphasize the extent of the audience.
In 1858, no more than 75,000 people heard Lincoln and Douglas in all their
seven Illinois debates. More than 85,000,000 people heard at least one of
the encounters between Kennedy and Nixon. More than 100,000,000 viewed
the first Ford-Carter debate. In 1980, over 50,000,000 tuned in on the Rea
gan-Anderson debate, and twice as many watched Reagan debate Carter.
The audience for the first Reagan-Mondale debate in 1984 numbered over
70,000,000, and for the second Reagan-Mondale debate it numbered over
75,000,000 for ABC alone, plus the CBS, NBC, and PBS viewers. We may not
be certain whether these people were informed on the issues more than
they were impressed by personalities or whether they changed their minds
significantly or merely confirmed their prejudices. In any case, the elec
tronic media made it possible for so many to see so much.
There is also, however, a pejorative sense of the term media event. Some
times it means a minor event, made to seem important by exaggerated
publicity. Other times, in the Daniel Boorstin tradition, it means an event
deliberately staged for maximum exposure by both the print and the elec
tronic media. Referring to the latter sense, I began in 1960 to speak and
write critically on the "Great Myths about the Great Debates." Now, speak
ing to a new generation, I repeat that not one joint press conference par
ticipated in by Anderson, Carter, Ford, Kenriedy, Mondale, Nixon, or Rea
gan was faithful to the tradition of Lincoln-Douglas. The 1858 debates had
five essentials, as have true debates throughout American history, whether
in debate as an educational method, as a legislative process, or as a judicial
procedure. These critical components of true debate are (1) participant con
frontation, (2) equal and adequate time for the participants, (3) a fair match
ing of participants, (4) debate on a stated proposition, and (5) the goal of
gaining an audience decision.
I hope you agree with me that the so-called Great Debates have been
deficient on each of these counts. Nevertheless, I am perfectly willing to
agree that imperfect debates are better than no meetings of the party nom
inees on the same platform, better even if the debaters must share the plat
form with a panel of journalists. But let us also agree that as educators we
should hope and work for improved quality and context for all public com
munication, especially communication by those whose guiding goal is to
become our president.
I believe that we should expose and attack every aspect of joint appear- .
ances on television that tends to make them media events at the expense of
their being true debates. I further believe that now is the time for public
exposure of the deficiencies of past presidential debates. Whereas there is
evidence of public understanding of the general purpose of these events.
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there is substantial evidence that both the format and the role of the panel
ists are in question. Never in the history of the presidential debates has
there been so much criticism of these elements as there was immediately
following the 1984 debates. The criticism came from broadcast commen
tators, respected columnists and editorial writers, and many members of the
general public. Even some advisors to political candidates objected. But by
1988 it will be too late to protest. By then the media will have hyped what
they think has worked to attract audiences in the past, the League of Wom
en Voters will again have failed to hold serious public hearings for advice
on what should be done, the expert political scientists and communication
critics will have been forgotten, and we will again complain about panel-
selection procedures when we should be asking how Lincoln and Douglas
managed to debate at all without any itinerant journalists on the platform
to guide (and distract) them. Let me remind you that 1988 must be our year
because, for the first time since 1960, neither major-party candidate will be
a White House incumbent. Both will be able to write on a clean slate.
Finally, I turn to my third argument; whether we succeed or fail to revive
the true Lincoln-Douglas tradition and cowboy at high noon myth, we are
about to see the political institutionalization of the presidential debate. In
1981 I wrote a piece for Speaker and Gavel in which I said it was a great
myth to believe that one day all presidential candidates would voluntarily,
regularly, and cheerfully take part in real debates. In rereading this gem, I
find that I said "the only way to ensure debates of any sort between presi
dential candidates in 1984 and after is to find a way to mandate them." And
I cited a number of widely discussed proposals to do just that, ranging from
simple supplication to the withholding of presidential campaign funds from
those who would not agree to debate. But I then questioned whether
Americans really wanted any kind of debate so much that they would con
sider commanding presidential candidates to hold them.
In reviewing this erroneous prediction, all I can plead is that, as the drunk
said after he had tossed a brick through the glass window, "It seemed like
a good idea at the time." The only escape I left open was a jaundiced
statement that whatever candidates did was what would serve their own
political ends and that future presidential debates would not evolve simply
from the candidates' desire to inform the electorate about critical political
issues.
This was, indeed, the explanation for the 1984 debates. Mondale knew
he had nothing to lose and perhaps something to gain by debating. Elizabeth
Drew talked with the Reagan advisors and reported in the New Yorker that
they gave her two reasons for letting their man debate. First, "they did not
think it would be politically acceptable to refuse to debate," and second,
they conceived that the race might "tighten sufficiently" by late October
for Reagan to need a debate to win.
I am now convinced that in the future, the American public will not look
with approval on any candidate who refuses to debate. In short, the debates
are now institutionalized. What we have to fear in this is that the media
people and some political advisors will hype the debates so much that they
will become the most important element of the campaign. As one of Reagan's
staff members told New York Times reporter Hedrick Smith in 1980,
9
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a debate with Carter was "one big crapshoot that could blow it all." In fact,
no matter how many nationally televised debates there may be, the voters
also need opportunities for face-to-face contact with those who seek their
votes.
We cannot predict what kind of debates lie ahead. Certainly the elements
of the Lincoln-Douglas model would be ideal. But of course it really de
pends on what the participants want, and how can we know that? Perhaps
we can imitate the young student at a medieval university: after listening to
a group of his professors debate for hours about how many teeth a horse
has, he was bold enough to bring a horse into the meeting so that the
scholars could count them. If we want to go to the "horse's mouth" with
this question, we need to check the opinions of those who have debated
in the past and those who have served on the journalist panels.
Warren Decker of George Mason University reported at the 1984 Speech
Communication Association convention that he had sent a questionnaire to
the seven politicians who had participated in presidential or vice presiden
tial debates. Reagan declined to respond; but Anderson, Carter, Dole, and
Ford returned questionnaires, as did another who remained anonymous but
who must have been Mondale or Nixon. From Decker's detailed report on
thirty-five items, I gratefully cite the findings on seven:
1. Four of the five agreed that there should be more opportunities to
debate during the campaign. Dole disagreed.
2. Three of the five agreed that debates should be a part of all presidential
and vice presidential campaigns. Dole and "anonymous" were unde
cided.
3. Four of the five agreed that the speaking style of the participants has
greater impact than the quality of argument in the debates. Ford dis
agreed.
4. All five agreed that the debates provide an opportunity for the public
to see the candidates exhibit spontaneous behavior.
5. All five agreed that the exhibition of spontaneous behavior is impor
tant.
6. All five agreed that the opportunity to directly question your oppo
nent is desirable.
7. All five agreed that candidates should be given a certain amount of
time during the debates to use as they wish.
Professor Decker provided a prudent caveat that of course the ex-can-
didates might well now approve something they would have rejected when
they were personally involved in a debate.
Now we turn briefly to what those who have served as panelists think
about their intrusive debate roles. Cindy L. White, while at Indiana Univer
sity, completed an investigation into this topic. Eleven of the thirty-five
extant members of panels in the 1960, 1978, and 1980 debates responded
to her questionnaire. Three of her extensive findings are relevant here. In
the panelists' judgment of how well the debaters responded, three felt that
the debaters "evaded" the questions, seven felt that they "answered di
rectly, but not adequately," and one declined to respond. When asked how
to improve the debates, five said "eliminate the panel," three said "include
10
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more follow-up questions," and two urged more opportunities for the de
baters to question each other. And when asked whether the purposes of
the debates were served by the use of panels, only one respondent gave an
unqualified "Yes."
To summarize, on the basis of a seventy-one percent response from the
debaters, a majority favored campaign debates, even though they felt that
speaking style was weightier than argument. They unanimously wanted the
debaters to question each other and thus exhibit spontaneous behavior, but
they wanted the debaters to be given some time to use in any way they
wished. Accommodating these views obviously would require a change in
format in the direction of the Lincoln-Douglas model.
On the basis of a thirty-one percent response from the panelists, all but
one felt that the debaters gave evasive or inadequate replies to their queries.
Consequently, nearly half would eliminate the panels, nearly another half
would make substantial changes, and only one respondent stood pat. These
responses also call for a changed format, again in the Lincoln-Douglas di
rection.
In conclusion, if this brief contrast of contemporary presidential debates
against the national mythology of Lincoln and Douglas at high noon has any
merit, it is to underscore the need for securing a change in the format of
the 1988 debates.
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AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE CONSTRAINTS
AFFECTING GERALDINE FERRARO'S
PREPARATION FOR THE 1984
VICE PRESIDENTIAL DEBATE
Dayle Hardy-Short
A New York Times-CBS News poll released in April 1984 suggested that if
the Democratic party ran a woman as a vice presidential candidate, it would
probably gain "as many votes from women as it would lose from men."i
The idea of including a woman on the Democratic ticket had been gaining
support for months. In assessing the chances for a victory in November,
Mike Ford, Walter Mondale's field director, suggested that the Mondale
campaign "must consider dramatic and perhaps high-risk strategies,"^ which
might include choosing a female running mate. After three weeks of inter
views with seven potential running mates,^ Mondale announced an un
precedented "dramatic" strategy—he would ask a woman, the represen
tative from Queens, to run as the Democratic vice presidential candidate.
By accepting, Geraldine Ferraro helped assure a place in history for both
candidates and for the Democratic campaign. In September 1984, Ferraro
invited me to be on her debate staff; and in early October, she called to
ask me to join the team in New York City.
As rhetorical critics, one of our goals is to examine public communication
in an attempt to understand its place in and effect upon our society, j.
Jeffery Auer suggests that a critic fulfills "three functional roles": reporter,
analyst, and judge. The reporter may "work from first-hand observations"
or from others' firsthand observations, without attempting to analyze or
interpret the information. As analyst, the critic "builds upon the reporter's
narration" by using "special knowledge of rhetorical theory and criticism"
to illuminate the rhetorical event. Finally, the critic as judge evaluates the
event and its effect based on the work of the reporter and the analyst. Auer
refers to this procedure as "narration, explication, and evaluation."'' In this
paper, I shall play the role primarily of reporter and provide limited analysis
of the rhetorical event. Any judgment I might offer would undoubtedly be
Dayle Hardy-Short is Visiting Instructor of Speech Communication in the
Speech and Theatre Department at Idaho State University. A version of this
paper was presented at the 1985 Speech Communication Association meet
ing in Denver, Colorado.
' Adam Clymer, "Woman Wouldn't Hurt Democrats, Poll Finds," Courier-Journal
[Louisville, KY] 30 Apr. 1984, sec. A: 4.
Quoted in Peter Goldman et al., "Campaign '84: The inside Story," Newsweek
Nov.-Dec. 1984: 81.
^ William Chaze, "Why it's Ferraro for Veep," U.S. News and World Report 23 July
1984; 21.
" J. Jeffery Auer, "What Does a Rhetorical Critic Do?" unpublished paper, Indiana
U, 1981, 3-4.
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1986), 8-22.
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biased. However, there is a place in rhetorical criticism for more participant
observation, because despite our most careful research, we must to some
extent speculate about events. Firsthand observation might help us to con
firm or reject some of our work or allow us to redirect our research and
analysis. In this paper, I focus on Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro's debate
preparations in an attempt to understand more about the constraints^ she
faced in her debate with Vice President George Bush on 11 October 1984.
Comparison of these constraints with those of similar situations may provide
a generic basis for analyzing debate constraints, although the purpose of
this essay is only to suggest a possible direction.
Background
Almost immediately after the announcement that Ferraro would be Mon-
dale's running mate, Mondale and Ferraro challenged their opponents.
President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George Bush, to debate.
"Everybody keeps comparing me to Vice President George Bush," Repre
sentative Ferraro said, "and that's delightful because I should think we would
have a debate or two during the course of this campaign," adding, "we'll
let the people of America see whether or not I'm able to keep up with
George Bush."® Bush initially said he would debate'' but avoided committing
himself until after the Republican convention."
Mondale and Ferraro originally asked for six presidential debates and three
vice presidential debates, each of which would focus on one issue. After
much negotiation, it was agreed that there would be two presidential de
bates and one vice presidential debate. The debate between the two vice
presidential candidates was to be ninety minutes long, with a moderator
and four panelists who would be mutually agreed upon by the two cam
paigns' negotiating teams. The first four questions were to deal with do
mestic issues, and the second four would cover foreign affairs. The process
for selecting the panelists was unexpectedly complex. The League of Wom
en Voters submitted a list of journalists' names to each campaign, and each
indicated the questioners it found acceptable. Names appearing on both
lists were to make up a third list from which the League would select the
final four panelists. Bush's campaign rejected most of the names submitted.
" Lloyd Bitzer defines constraints as "persons, events, objects, and relations which
are parts of the situation because they have the power to constrain decision and
action needed to modify the exigence." He adds that "standard sources of constraints
include beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives and
the like...." See "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (Jan. 1968):
1-14.
® Quoted in Sara Fritz, "Ferraro Challenges Bush, Assails President," Courier-Journal
[Louisville, KY] 14 July 1984, sec. A: 3.
' "Ferraro Challenges Bush to Debate," Herald and Review [Decatur, IL] 14 July 1984,
sec. A: 4.
"See "White House is Seen Hedging on Debate by'VP Candidates," San Antonio
Light 3 Aug. 1984, sec. A: 3; "No Debate?" Washington Post Weekly 20 Aug. 1984: 27;
and Gerald M. Boyd, "Debate With Ferraro Only Part of Battle," New York Times 20
Aug. 1984, sec. A: n.p.
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and by the time the process was finished, sometime during the week of the
debate, over one hundred names had been submitted for consideration.'
Debate Preparations
Anne Wexier, Ferraro's senior political advisor, and Robert Barnett, a
Washington, D.C., lawyer who had worked on the 1976 Mondale-Dole vice
presidential debate, were responsible for organizing Ferraro's debate team.™
Two sets of briefing materials were prepared: domestic issues materials,
under the supervision of Wexier and Barnett; and foreign issues materials,
under the supervision of Madeleine Albright and Barry Carter. Albright was
part of Ferraro's regular traveling staff, but most of the work for the briefing
books was done by outside people, "high-level volunteers" who did not
travel regularly with the Ferraro campaign. By using outside people, the
campaign intended to bring a fresh perspective to the work and to ease the
burden of the regular staff.™ About two to three weeks before the debate,
the briefing materials were delivered to Ferraro, and she began studying
them on weekends and in her spare time.™ About a week before the debate,
formal preparations began.
The debate team and the candidate moved to the New York Sheraton
Centre Hotel to concentrate on informal question-and-answer sessions and
to begin some audiotaping and videotaping in order to analyze answers and
strategies.™ On Tuesday, 9 October, Ferraro and the debate team began
videotaping practice debates at Modern Telecommunications Incorporated
in New York. The intent was to "reconstruct" the hall in Philadelphia as
well as the debate format so that Ferraro would become familiar and com
fortable with the situation. Four practice debates were scheduled—two each
on Tuesday and Wednesday—using the same format as that negotiated for
the debate on Thursday. Robert Barnett role-played George Bush, and Fer
raro played herself. Each debate was taped, analyzed, and replayed. No
observers interrrupted the practices, and Barnett and Ferraro took the re
hearsals seriously. Occasionally, one or the other would muff an answer but
would quickly go on to the next question. The purpose of the rehearsals
was not for Ferraro to "memorize" answers but rather for her to practice
putting together the information she had learned in ways that would dem
onstrate the superiority of the Mondale-Ferraro ticket. After each session,
Ferraro would go off with one group of advisors to watch a replay of the
tape and make any necessary phone calls, while another group (usually the
questioners and moderator along with some regular staff members) would
sit and review her answers, looking for strengths, weaknesses, and factual
' Anne Wexier (Ferraro campaign senior political advisor), telephone interview, 24
Sept. 1985.
™ Members included Ben W. Heineman, Jr.; Robert Liberatore; Kay Casstevens;
Barry Carter; Richard Goodstein; Anne Karalekes; Marcia McGraw Olive; and Richart
Betts.
™ Wexier interview; Steven Engelberg (Ferraro campaign issues director), telephone
interview, 26 Sept. 1985.
™ Eleanor Lewis (Ferraro campaign executive assistant), written questionnaire, 9 Aug.
1985.
" Wexier interview, Engelberg interview, Lewis questionnaire.
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errors. This second group would reach consensus about what in the answers
they felt needed changing and would then meet with Ferraro and the first
group to discuss the answers. The entire group would reach consensus on
the substance of answers, after which I would talk about delivery and pre
sentation for a few minutes. We would then break for lunch. In the after
noon, we would run through a second set of possible questions, following
the same procedure. After the second debate each day, we went back to
the Sheraton to work, while Ferraro went home to study further and to
work on her closing statement.
Ferraro and the press have both documented her public speaking char
acteristics. She is "witty and forceful" and "does well on TV," although her
"tendency to speak her mind" might be a "mixed blessing."" Early in the
campaign, there was some concern that she might be "too New York wise
guy" to appeal to voters, but crowds enjoyed her "colloquial diction" and
"frank approach." They found her "honest and approachable." Her Queens
accent includes "an energetic pace that runs words together five at a time.""
Ferraro is quite conscious of her accent and pace. When I first met her, she
asked me if I could teach her "to talk slower." When remembering her
preparation to accept the Democratic nomination for vice president, she
recounts that her thoughts were "speak slowly and don't trip... . speak
s-l-o-w-l-y."^'' Ferraro felt she "talked too fast" and "swallowed" her sylla
bles." Still, crowds reacted favorably, and she was even able to take advan
tage of her "sassy Queens speaking style"" in quieting some particularly
persistent hecklers in Arlington, Texas. "You're wonderful," she told them.
"You've figured out how to stop this New Yorker from talking too quick
ly."'"
But the group feared that Ferraro's direct and hard-hitting stump style
might not work quite as successfully on television; both she and her staff
wanted to make sure she looked capable, serious, and thoughtful during
the debate. Part of our videotape analysis focused on her delivery. The notes
I took during the practice debates indicate that Ferraro frowned when she
listened to questions from the panelists and answers from Bush/Barnett, so
despite some misgivings from a couple of the other team members, I urged
her to wear her glasses. She often wore glasses when speaking at rallies, but
there was concern that these might not look good on television, that she
might look too serious. 1 knew Ferraro was not frowning so much as she
was straining to see the panelists. Previous observation of her had shown
that if she wore her glasses, she would not squint or grimace. Ironically,
although we had not expected him to, Bush wore his glasses to the debate.
Engelberg interview.
" Chaze 21-23.
" Maureen Dowd, "Whaddyamean Accent? She Talks Queensl" New York Times 1
Oct. 1984, sec. A: 1.
" Geraldine A. Ferraro, Ferraro: My Story (New York: Bantam Books, 1985) 12.
" Ferraro, My Story 187.
" Dowd, "Whaddyamean Accent?" 1.
Maureen Dowd, "Ferraro Counters Hecklers in Texas With Show of Wit," New
York Times 21 Sept. 1984, sec. A: 17.
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which made moot the whole concern about how she would look compared
to Bush.
My notes also indicate that in practices, Ferraro "seemed to be reading
notes—too much," that during the Wednesday practices she was "taking
too many notes," which differed from Tuesday, when she seemed not to
be taking enough notes, but that her "listening style [was] much better,"
because she was "either writing or listening." Earlier in the practices, Ferraro
appeared not to be listening carefully to Bush/Barnett answers, although
her answers indicated that she had listened carefully. Throughout my notes
I had written "leaning on lecturn too much" which "prevents gesturing"
and that she should "try to stand up straight—stand on both feet." She had
always tended to put weight on one foot or prop a foot up on the lecturn.
We encouraged her to put her pen down after she had finished writing
something so that her gestures would be more natural. We also suggested
that she step away from the lecturn to avoid using it too much. Of course,
because she is only five feet four inches tall, a riser had been built for
Ferraro's lecturn so that she could be seen over it and so that Bush would
not seem to overwhelm her. Consequently, she could not move too far
away from the lecturn or from side to side because she would either fall off
the riser or appear to get shorter. This problem plagues most women can
didates. Ferraro and I had worked on this before—how to compensate for
the fact that standing lecturns are built for an average-height man rather
than for an average-height woman.
On Wednesday, I noted that her gestures seemed to be "more open
today," that she was "listening better to Bush," but that when standing
straight, she had a tendency to stand almost in a military pose: hands behind
her back, shoulders high, and chest out. I told her I could see her mother
telling her "stand up straight, Gerry" and advised her to rest her hands on
the sides of the lecturn to demonstrate control of the situation.
I also noted that there was a "marked difference in tone" when she de
livered her closing statement compared with when she answered questions.
Ferraro and Fred Martin, her chief speech writer, had worked very hard on
her closing statement; it was the real Ferraro. She really believed in and
cared about what she was saying, and we could see and hear her conviction.
This is not to suggest that she believed her closing statement more than her
answers. Rather, in the answers, just as in a court case she might be pros
ecuting, she was trying to establish the facts of the case, and she needed to
be careful to get the facts correct. Her closing statement, her peroration,
was designed to summarize the Democratic position on the important issues
and involve the audience emotionally in her ideas. Her closing statement
was meant to be spoken directly to the audience-at-large.
The final draft of the final statement was ready Wednesday. Early Thursday
morning I went out to Ferraro's home to be available in case she was ready
to go over it. She greeted me by saying she was not ready and wanted to
go over it some more by herself. A couple of hours later, she was ready and
we marked up the final draft. When I had first worked with Ferraro, we had
devised a method of reading the speech out loud to a listener to gauge
reactions and highlight phrases and words. She had continued to follow this
procedure, and her texts usually showed evidence of her having underlined
16
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and accented words and phrases for emphasis. We decided the closing
statement was divided into four major points that were important to em
phasize and convey: American values, patriotism, Mondale's history, and
Mondale's leadership. Because the rules of the debate forbade candidates
to bring notes to the lecturn with them, I suggested that Ferraro might walk
out on stage, shake hands with Bush, then go to her lecturn and jot down
these four points. These would then stimulate her memory when she was
ready for the closing statement. She agreed to try it; so we spent more time
working on her memorization. However, we also said that while she should
try to remember the "right" things to say, no one would know if she "for
got" something. She knew the substance of her speech; and using exact
wording was less important than conveying her general ideas. She appeared
to be nervous, but she was clearly ready for the debate.
The motorcade trip to the airport was brief. Once on the plane, Ferraro
appeared much more confident and prepared to do her best against Bush.
For most of the short flight to Philadelphia, she went over her closing state
ment in the entry area near the cockpit. She delivered it for John, Jr., then
called me forward. She didn't "want everyone on the plane to watch," she
said. She delivered it to me twice, with conviction and fervor. I told her it
was near-perfect, that if she did it half as well that night she would have
everyone crying. Some staffers who were also understandably nervous asked
me afterwards how she was. "She's fine," I said. "She's ready. She'll be just
great."
Debate Constraints
In preparing the briefing books, the team had focused on the twelve
domestic and twelve foreign issues we thought most likely to be covered
by the panelists during the debate. These would be the issues most actively
pursued by the press so far In the campaign and the questions the staff
thought might come up because Ferraro is a woman. Staffers saw the brief
ing books as a particular strength of the debate preparations, because every
question panelists asked had been anticipated and rehearsed."
Ferraro faced four constraints in her debate with Bush. The first com
prised the issues she had had to deal with throughout the campaign. The
other three were high expectations by the press, her sex, and the debate
format itself. These four constraints affected Ferraro's preparation for and
behavior during the debate. To prove she could fulfill her vice presidential
responsibilities, Ferraro had to overcome public concern surrounding three
issues that constituted the first constraint: abortion, family finances, and level
of experience.
The press had focused on the abortion issue largely because of the pro-
life hecklers who had turned out at most rallies and because the Catholic
bishops, particularly Archbishop John j. O'Connor of New York, repeatedly
and publicly attacked Ferraro's pro-choice position. Ferraro had explained
her position on abortion time and again, but the debate was a national forum
" Wexier interview.
" Wexier interview, Engelberg interview, Lewis questionnaire.
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was speaking. Some of her staffers did not remember her having done this
In rehearsal, but my notes indicate that she had. When she later saw a tape
of the debate, Ferraro said she was "unhappy about my staring down at my
notes" and "not looking up at the camera" but was "responding to the
circumstances" of a "debate between two candidates for the Vice Presi
dency of the United States."" Throughout the campaign, Ferraro had de
cided how she wanted to appear, and the "I am qualified" demeanor and
subdued tone were her choices. Part of the problem was that she was trying
to look at the audience in the debate hall in addition to the blue light above
the television cameras. Thus, her attempt at eye contact with the immediate
audience meant a loss of eye contact with the larger audience.^® One staff
member noted that Ferraro did not regret her decision to be more calm,
although on a recent Donahue show, Ferraro laughingly admitted that she
would raise her head more "the next time" she debated on television.^®
The immediate reaction of some television commentators was that Fer-
raro's manner and foreign policy responses had been second to Bush's. The
later polls and newspaper reports, however, gave the edge to Ferraro.^® She
was "poised, informed, articulate" and "made consistent sense," noted one
columnist. "At critical moments, as with her comments on religion and the
nuclear button, she showed a superb mixture of firmness and thoughtful-
ness."^^ Another reporter observed that she "showed she could stay in the
ring with the incumbent," which might have been "enough to win her the
respect of many skeptics.'"^ Her careful and factual responses and com
ments proved to be more important than her delivery—which is the prin
ciple we try to teach our public speaking students.
The second constraint Geraldine Ferraro faced in her debate with George
Bush was high expectations from the press. Not long after the debate had
been agreed to, one columnist made this observation: "I'd bet .. . on the
outcome of the Bush vs. Ferraro bout. Ferraro has to win."^^ Ferraro was
expected to win. Furthermore, after Mondale's strong showing against Rea
gan in the first debate, the vice presidential debate "assumed added im
portance," although the Bush campaign tried to emphasize the presidential
debates as most important and the Democratic campaign tried to decrease
the pressure by claiming Ferraro "doesn't need to score a knockout."**
Members of Ferraro's staff believed that her press conference performance
had been so impressive that reporters expected her to "blow Bush away"
with a "slashing, acerbic" debate style, which probably would have been
detrimental to her campaign in the long run. Had she not answered ques-
" Ferraro, My Story 265-66.
" Lewris questionnaire.
" The Donahue Show, aired on San Antonio NBC affiliate, 18 Oct. 1984.
Peter Goldman and Tony Fuller et al.. The Quest for the Presidency 1984 (New
York: Bantam Books, 1984) 331.
" Jim Fain, "Bush Won? Sez Who?" Herald and Review [Decatur, IL] 18 Oct. 1984,
sec. A: 8.
*'West, "Both Lost Chances" 1.
*' Sandy Grady, "Bush vs. Ferraro: A Debatable Decision," San Anton/o Light 15 Aug.
1984, sec. C: 5.
" Howell Raines, "Both Camps Say Debate Could Shift Campaign Debate," New
York Vmes 12 Oct. 1984, sec. B: 5.
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tions about her family finances so well, the press might have had more
questions about her skill but been more impressed by her debating/' After
the debate, both staffs continued to argue that the vice presidential debate
would have little effect on the presidential campaign, that it would not
change many votes/^ At least part of the press agreed. The debate would
"probably go down in the history books," one editorial noted, "as an in
teresting but inconsequential aspect of the 1984 presidential campaign."*'
Ferraro aides wanted the media and the public to focus on the issues raised
during the campaign and the debate rather than on the confrontation be
tween the two candidates. Bush aides may have wanted to keep the focus
on the ticket's real strength—the top.
Ferraro's third constraint was that she was the first woman to run as a
party-endorsed vice presidential candidate. In a sense, this constraint inter
acted with the issue of her leadership ability and experience. Ferraro was
certainly aware of the problems she might face as a woman in the campaign.
"A woman has to be very, very careful about the way she's perceived," she
told Mother Jones magazine. "A woman can't be pushy, or she's called a
shrew."*® Her femaleness caused problems for Bush and his staff—they had
no experience campaigning against a woman and did not know whether to
ignore her, treat her as they would a man, or hope that she would make
some tremendous gaffe and destroy herself. When the campaigns agreed
to a debate. Bush had to face the question of how to respond to a woman
candidate. The Washington Post noted that Bush "would have to be careful
not to appear a brute or a condescending MCP "*® An unidentified
Republican detailed the pitfalls awaiting Bush. "If he's too gallant she'll dom
inate him. If he's too tough, he'll look like a bully. And we all know," the
politician continued, "George Bush has not been a great debater."'®
The strain on Bush and his staff showed. On the Monday before the
debate, Barbara Bush, the vice president's wife, commented to reporters
that she and her husband were wealthy and enjoyed it, "not like that four
million-dollar—I can't say it, but it rhymes with rich."" She later apologized,
saying she "would never call Congresswoman Ferraro a witch."" A Demo
cratic staffer said Mrs. Bush's comments were "another reflection" of the
unease the Republicans felt about opposing a woman on the ticket." The
day before the debate, the vice president's press secretary, Peter Teeley,
told a Wall Street Journal reporter that Ferraro was "too bitchy" and "very
arrogant." He later explained that he meant she should avoid "being screechy
or scratchy" in the debate but that "bitchy" was an "adequate" word to
*' Engelberg interview.
** Paul West, "Debate Skirmish Won't Win War," Dallas Times Herald 13 Oct. 1984,
sec.A: 26.
*' "The Debates: Round 2," Dallas Times Herald 13 Oct. 1984, sec. A: 30.
•' Kaye Northcott, "Only a Heartbeat Away," Mother Jones June 1984: 38.
** "No Debate?" 27.
Crady 5.
"Bush's Wife Assails Ferraro, But Apologizes," New York Times 9 Oct. 1984, sec.
A: 20.
" "Day After Remark 'Unpleasant,'" New York Times 10 Oct. 1984, sec. A: 21.
" "Bush's Wife Assails Ferraro" 20.
19
et al.: Complete Issue 24(1)
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 1986
18 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
describe what he meant." Later Teeley told the New York Times that "get
ting into a cat fight with Bush is not going to win the eiection."®^ Apparently
Bush hadn't learned anything from the negative reactions his wife and staff
had been receiving all week, because the day after the debate, he "used an
old Texas football expression" when he claimed "we tried to kick a little
ass" during the debate.^^ The remarks were at best insensitive and at worst
sexist. And of course they angered the Democrats. Ferraro said later that
she thought the remarks had been "planned," that they were "a bit of a
put-down" because the Bushes were "not the type of people who acciden
tally let something like that slip out."" The comments might have been
made, she thought, because the Republicans were "beginning to get a little
worried" about the polls."
It seemed that no one in the Republican campaign knew how to behave.
A White House staffer said before the debate that it "would be horrible,"
because Bush would "have to walk a very tight rope between not appearing
patronizing and making it appear that this man is beating up on a woman.""
All of this skirmishing about how the Republicans and Bush should treat
Ferraro set up a no-win situation for her, and she knew it. She remarked
that the off-polor comments "might be a bit of a statement" on her can
didacy—"who am I to challenge this man?""
Bush could be a gentleman during the debate, which might be inter
preted as patronizing; or he could be aggressive, which might be inter
preted as brow-beating or bullying. Ferraro, on the other hand, could be
ladylike, which would make her appear uninformed and too delicate to do
the job; or she could be assertive, which would make her appear bitchy.
Culturally, though we may wish to deny it, we still have a double standard
for men and women who seek power. Men who seek power are strong-
willed and aggressive, whereas women who seek power are unnatural, stri
dent, and bitchy. Bush and his staff can attribute innocence to their remarks,
but they are astute enough to have known how to set up a particular psy
chological atmosphere for the debate, and intentional or not, they suc
ceeded. If Ferraro had been "feisty Ferraro," she would have walked right
into the trap; voters would have agreed she was just as bitchy as Pete Teeley
had suggested. One columnist observed that "setting a woman up as bitchy
because she has the temerity to seek national office... reeks of chauvinism"
and "of trying to exploit sex stereotypes for political gain."" This is exactly
what the Bush campaign did. Ferraro was understandably angry about the
" "Bush Aide: Ferraro 'Screechy, Scratchy,"' Houston Post 12 Oct. 1984, sec. A: 1.
" Phil Galley, "Bush-Ferraro Debate Today Seen as Vita! by Opposing Campaigns,"
New York Times 11 Oct. 1984, sec. A: 15.
" "Bush: 'We Tried to Kick a Little ...,'" Dallas Times Herald 13 Oct. 1984, sec.
A: 1.
" Gerald M. Boyd, "Ferraro Assails Reagan as Captive of 'the Powerful and the
Greedy,"' New York Times 17 Oct. 1984, sec. A: 12.
" "Mondaie Portrays as 'Hoax' Reagan's Space-Arms Plan," New York Times 15 Oct.
1984, sec. A: 10.
" Gerald M. Boyd, "Debate With Ferraro Only Part of Battle," New York Times 20
Aug. 1984, sec. A: n.p.
" "Mondaie Portrays as 'Hoax'" 10.
" Fain 8.
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widely printed comments. Even so, not once in rehearsal was there any
discussion of how to "put down" Bush. It was important for her to be calm
and controlled and to behave as if she belonged there.
Thus, Ferraro made the decision to tone down her delivery and to deal
with issues rather than innuendos. She succeeded, although at one point
she told Bush she "almost resent[ed]" his "patronizing attitude" toward her
concerning foreign affairs.^^ Her remark was spontaneous—it had not been
discussed previously—and undoubtedly was not directed solely at Bush's
comment on the difference between Iran and Lebanon. Though the ques
tioners/press panel had agreed to direct their questions to "Congresswom-
an Ferraro" and "Vice President Bush," Bush referred to Ferraro as "Mrs.
Ferraro" throughout the debate. She said nothing about it and consistently
addressed him as "Vice President Bush." Had she complained throughout
the debate about his attitude, she most certainly would have lost far more
than she would have gained. As it was, she did the right thing at the right
time. If she had said nothing, the public might have thought she "couldn't
take it," that she would give in to her "betters"—men. That was not the
image for a vice president.
The fourth constraint, although not affecting Ferraro alone, was the de
bate format. The close-ups that television allows would force both candi
dates to tone down their styles; and because the debate was aimed at an
audience not present, the candidates would have to speak much differently
than they would at rallies. This factor accounts in part for the impression
that Ferraro had changed her style to debate Bush. The press and the public
had perhaps been paying more attention to Ferraro's stump speaking than
Bush's because she was the first woman candidate; the press had reported
her style in much more detail than they had Bush's. Her "Reagan-bashing"
was little different in purpose from Richard Nixon's, Robert Dole's, and
Spiro Agnew's hatchetman task in previous campaigns—which the press and
public seemed to have forgotten. This time, however, it was a woman "talk
ing back." Vice presidential candidates have often had the task of attacking
the incumbent or the opponent's top-of-the-ticket. Bush said repeatedly
that he wanted to keep the focus on the presidential race, and so did Mon-
dale-Ferraro. Bush spent as much time attacking Mondale's "doom and
gloom" as Ferraro spent attacking Reagan. That is part of the process. So
when Ferraro reverted to her nonrally style, the style she used with non-
partisan groups and hostile crowds, the reaction was that she had changed,
that she had been told to tone it down. Apart from the fact that Ferraro
does not take orders, she was simply adjusting to the situation, which re
quired a performance more subdued than one she would give at a rally of
twenty thousand supporters.
Vice President Bush commented a month before the debate that he would
view it as "not any different to any press conference."®^ According to the
format, the two candidates would stand at lecturns approximately eight feet
apart, and a panel of four journalists would address similar questions to each
"New York Times Transcript 5.
"Steven R. Weisman, "Reagan and Mondale to Debate Twice, Running Mates
Once," New York Times 18 Sept. 1984, sec. A: 9.
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of them through a moderator. There would be no direct confrontation
between the candidates, although each would have an opportunity to ad
dress the other's comments during a rebuttal. Auer has stated that the five
requirements of a debate are "(1) participant confrontation, (2) equal and
adequate time for the participants, (3) a fair matching of participants, (4)
debate on a stated proposition, and (5) the goal of gaining an audience
decision" and that contemporary political "debates" do not truly meet all
of these requirements." Analysis of the debate format by Ferraro staff mem
bers supports Auer's conclusions. Anne Wexler would like to see "real"
debates between candidates, rather than the "Meet-the-Press" format cur
rently used. "Why should the issues be filtered through questioners?" she
asks. "Direct confrontation is better." Wexler suggests that the format in
clude an opening statement by each candidate, with a strong moderator to
control time, statements and questions directed by the candidates to each
other, and closing rebuttals. This would "serve the candidates better and
serves the public better" because it allows an open forum where the voters
can "see the experience and knowledge of the candidates." Wexler also
feels that if the debates were to focus on one issue instead of many, the
public would learn much more about the candidates and the issues."
Steven Engelberg, Ferraro's issues director, agrees. He says the debates
are very "sterile," just "press conferences with the occasion to pick at the
opponent"—a "Meet-the-Press" format. He would like to see a "looser,
give-and-take atmosphere" in which candidates "are free to contradict each
other"—perhaps somewhat similar to the New York round table used in
the Democratic primaries. His main criticism of the present format is that
the debates are "televised press conferences ... which we already have."
The "more sterile they are," Engelberg adds, "the more they can be set up
to meet the candidates' needs" rather than the public's needs, and the more
they can be used as "tricks." The current format allows the voter to see
only "some glimpses of character." He believes the debates can be useful.
"Speaking as a citizen," Engelberg observes, the debates' "purpose is to let
us see the candidates as realistically as possible," to "see how they think,
feel, react, and their intellectual ability." He would suggest a format that
includes the candidates and a "very strong moderator.""
These observations shed further light on Ferraro's perceived change in
style. The press may have expected her to lash out or to be hard-hitting
and confrontational. But her subject throughout the campaign had been
Reagan and his policies, not the press. Had she continued in her former
style for the debate, she would have been attacking the press. At one point,
she responded to a question by asking "are you saying that I would have to
have fought in the war in order to love peace?"®'^ During rehearsal, she had
planned to say that to Bush, not to the journalist. Other than this comment,
the "don't patronize me" remark was the only bit of direct confrontation
" J. Jeffery Auer, "Presidential Debates: Public Understanding and Political Instl-
tutionailzatlon," Speaker and Gavel 24 (Fall 1986): 1.
" Wexler interview.
" Engelberg interview.
" New York Times Transcript 6.
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in the whole debate. The format was probably as responsible as anything
else for Ferraro's subdued manner—It simply did not permit any hint of her
usual rally style, even if she had wanted to speak that way.
Discussion
Apart from what the candidates may or may not have done correctly and
the vantage point of hindsight, there are some other issues at stake when
we look at the place of nationally televised debates in presidential and vice
presidential campaigns. Auer has suggested that when "we asked for public
presidential debates" we created a situation in which a "media event" was
"wedded" to television and that "we are about to see the political institu-
tionalization of presidential debate,"" Although Auer was speaking specif
ically of presidential debates, the debate forum can be so useful in allowing
the public to get to know both members of the ticket that vice presidential
debates will probably also continue. Most critics seem to agree that the
debates are now almost a permanent fixture of the campaigns. A number
of critics have called for those of us in the speech discipline to work with
the League of Women Voters to devise a more useful format. Certainly
members of the campaign staff I worked with and interviewed would like a
different format, one with more direct confrontation between the candi
dates and less interference from the journalists. One topic we in academics
have hardly discussed is the need for those of us who study debate and
public communication to work with members of the media to provide more
intelligent analysis of the debates in the period immediately following each
debate. Jody Powell observed that "major news organizations" continue to
refuse "to devote the minimal resources necessary to assemble a small squad
of researchers who" would "provide post-debate commentators and ana
lysts with the information needed to call baloney on candidates who make
clear misrepresentations. As a result," Powell continued, "the public was
again treated to musings on who looked more presidential, who was 'in
charge,'" both of which "viewers are perfectly capable of deciding for
themselves."" We critics have complained long and bitterly about the "in
stant analysis" the national networks provide, although they have toned it
down somewhat. Nonverbal communication, to be sure, does give the pub
lic an impression of what a candidate may be like, However, I am concerned
that in the case of the Ferraro/Bush debate, the media were more worried
about Ferraro's "looking down" than about Bush's rambling and unorga
nized answers. I am concerned that the media commentators seemed to
describe only how the speakers looked rather than why they might have
said or done what they did. We who teach debate teach our students to
make sure they take careful notes and get their information right. Ferraro
was trained as a lawyer; all of her experience has shown that she must be
careful with her information, take accurate notes, and make sure that she
" J. Jeffery Auer, "Presidential Debates: Public Understanding and Political Insti-
tutionaiization," paper presented to Central States Speech Association, Apr. 1985: 4,
6, 9.
"Jody Powell, "The Envelope, Please, For Debate Award Winners," Houston Post
10 Oct. 1984, sec. B; 2.
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uses the facts correctly. Having also been trained to do careful research and
to refer to my notes for accuracy, It simply never occurred to me that
anyone could fault Ferraro for referring to her notes. I see this priority
problem In my student speeches as well. Students often seem to feel that
the best speech Is the one In which the speaker uses no notes—regardless
of the effect on accuracy.
We have a responsibility as teachers of speech to establish criteria for the
public to use In evaluating political debates. We certainly do so In academic
debate; but when It comes to public debates, we let journalists set the
standards for how the debates ought to be judged. We have a responsibility
as professionals In speech communication to make every effort to redirect
the media's attention and the public's attention to the other components
of good and ethical speaking. After all, delivery Is only one of six compo
nents on a debate ballot, yet It becomes the only component for public
presidential and vice presidential debates. And we call memory the "lost
canon of rhetoric." I am not yet convinced that the best plan Is to set up a
panel of "expert" debate coaches to "judge" the debates every four years,
although this move Is certainly one we can make. I would like to see our
discipline take the lead In establishing a task force to devise ways of con
veying Information about the commonly accepted standards of rhetorical
criticism to those In the media who cover the debates. Perhaps In this way
we could encourage the media to work with us In providing a real service
for the public—a discussion of the debates that focuses on something be
sides appearance and outdated elocutionary gestures.
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A GOALS CRITERIA APPROACH:
PREPARING THE PUBLIC TO EVALUATE
PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES
Brant Short
The rise of political debate in recent years, especially at the presidential
level, has provided a rich source for research and teaching. This essay seeks
to broaden our concern with debates to the area of public service. As teach
ers of communication, we operate under certain assumptions every time
we grade a speech, give a lecture, or write an exam. Through such activity,
we endorse the belief that communication is a consequential activity that
can be improved through practice, analysis, and feedback. As a result, we
promote skills for both practitioners and consumers of communication. With
this shared goal in mind, I propose that teachers of speech communication
ought to consider possible methods of helping the public to understand
and to evaluate political debate.
Like academic debate, presidential debates seem to have as many detrac
tors as proponents. For every argument advanced in favor of debates, some
one Issues a counterpoint. The danger of the presidential debate, writes
Richard Cohen, is that It "obscures what we already know. It comes so
highly trumpeted, so charged with high school images of ancient Greece,
that it is hard to realize that it is nothing more than yet another performance
having next to nothing to do with the presidency." Historian Henry Steele
Commager agrees, noting that debates "submit the greatest elective office
in the world to the chance of arbitrary and miscellaneous questions, not so
much to elicit information or illuminate problems as to titillate the public."
No less an authority on presidential debates than Richard Nixon observed
that many pundits in 1984 wildly exaggerated the "importance and impact
of the debates." "The reason for this," Nixon concluded, "is that their his
torical perspective is skewed."^ On the other hand, supporters identify var
ied benefits. Nelson Polsby claims that debates help arouse the voter's at
tention, allow the candidates to speak without a filter or interruption, and
give the candidates the opportunity to delineate the differences between
themselves. After an extensive review of the research, Sidney Kraus and
Dennis K. Davis conclude that debates transmit information to voters who
have a "moderate to strong interest in politics" and that the debates serve
Brant Short is Assistant Professor of Speech Communication in the Speech
and Theatre Department at Idaho State University. A version of this paper
was presented at the 1985 Speech Communication Association meeting in
Denver, Colorado.
' Richard Cohen, Washington Post 23 Oct. 1980, sec. C: 1. Henry Steele Commager,
Los Angeles Times 2 Nov. 1980, sec. VI: 1. Richard Nixon, memo to Kenneth Khachi-
gian, printed in Peter Goldman and Tony Fuller, The Quest for the Presidency 1984
(New York: Bantam Books, 1985) 427.
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1986), 23-35.
25
et al.: Complete Issue 24(1)
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 1986
24 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
an important symbolic function by helping to "legitimize rational voting."^
Debating the merits of debate will probably continue every four years, at
least in the foreseeable future. Rather than confirming one side or the
other, this essay assumes that presidential debates are significant events that
have become de facto institutions in presidential campaigns. Having estab
lished that assumption, I turn to a different matter: How can speech com
munication professionals help the public to understand and to evaluate
future presidential debates? In this essay, I discuss problems inherent in the
media's evaluation of the debates, offer a different perspective for teaching
the public to watch such encounters, and assess how the perspective might
have been useful in 1980 and 1984.
Should academic observers be concerned that the public watches presi
dential debates without having any special knowledge or preparation? Will
not professional politicians present their views in an understandable and
ethical manner? I believe that there are legitimate reasons for all voters,
especially those who teach communication, to be concerned. The media's
obsession with the horse race metaphor and efforts to declare a winner and
a loser after each debate have created a situation in which voters are led to
believe that a victor should be obvious to the skilled critic. The result tends
to be joy in the camp of the "winner" and criticism from the "loser" on
the value of "debating points" and "debating tricks." In an attempt to de
termine how the public decides who "won" the debate, David Vancil and
Sue Pendell propose that at least six criteria provide possible explanations.
Their conclusion that no single criterion appears to be dominant suggests
to me that while debates are important, they are viewed with no systematic
means of evaluation.^
To help viewers better analyze a debate, some newspapers print college
debate ballots and even hire forensics coaches to judge the debate. Again,
the notion that a skilled analyst can somehow score the debate is advanced
by this practice ("Mondale won twenty-two to Reagan's seventeen, close
but not enough to overcome the president's lead"). The media's effort to eval
uate the debate seems to be even less useful for observers who want to
understand the event. Analyzing media coverage of the 1980 election, es
pecially that of television, Jeff Greenfield believes that reporters perceive
"speeches and issues" as tinsel behind which the real campaign occurs.
Obsessed with reporting "who's ahead," the media failed to reveal basic
differences between the candidates and spent a disproportionate amount
of time discussing behind-the-scenes strategy and tactics. Greenfield con
cludes that "The failure to cover consistently and conscientiously the strug
gle among competing views about the nature of government—which was
the heart of the real campaign—effectively helped disenfranchise the voter
^ Nelson W. Polsby, "Debatable Thoughts on Presidential Debates," The Past and
Future of Presidential Debates, ed. Austin Ranney (Washington, D.C.: American Enter
prise institute, 1979) 180-81. Sidney Kraus and Dennis K. Davis, "Political Debates,"
Handbook of Political Communication, ed. Dan D. Nimmo and Keith R. Sanders (Bev
erly Hills: Sage Pub., 1981) 290-91.
^ David L. Vancil and Sue D. Pendell, "Winning Presidential Debates," Western jour
nal of Speech Communication 48 (1984): 62-74.
26
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 1
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol24/iss1/1
SPEAKER AND GAVEL 25
by stripping him of any reason to care about the outcome."* Regarding the
Carter/Reagan debate, Greenfield found that the sports mentality of the
press ("Was there a knockout? If not, who won on points? Who landed the
deepest hits? Who parried better?"} led the media to miss the significance
of the encounter. Virtually ignoring Reagan's closing statement, which crys-
talized his entire campaign, the press missed the debate's real import: "no
one was left to consider the prospect that large numbers of undecided
Americans might be listening to the arguments the candidates were making."
In reality, Greenfield maintained, the debate enabled Reagan to "contrast
his beliefs with the record of Jimmy Carter's Presidency. That argument was
powerful and influential in the outcome of the 1980 election."^
Rather than simply berating the media's failure to provide insightful eval
uation of debates, I advocate that speech communication teachers, whether
debate coaches or not, serve their campus and local community by provid
ing an evaluative framework for viewing political debates. With the prolif
eration of "television debates,"'' especially those sponsored by the major
networks, primary and general election debates should continue unabated.
Moreover, with no incumbent in 1988, debates may prove essential to the
large fields of candidates from both parties seeking nomination. As a result,
1988 should offer many opportunities for presidential debates, from January
in New Hampshire to the national campaign in the fall.
To back my challenge with a workable method, I propose a "goals crite
ria" approach to help the public watch and analyze debates. Although I
searched for a better label, this very loose borrowing of that academic de-
bale term aptly summarizes my suggestion. I developed the goals criteria
approach to watching debates for a public lecture that I gave at Trinity
University in October 1984. Instead of detailing a history of presidential
debates or listing standard methods of judging debate, I sought an alter
native that would be different, interesting, and useful for an audience of
college students and faculty. To provide such a perspective, I examined the
Carter/Reagan debate, considering the debate itself, pre-debate and post-
debate predictions and pronouncements, and the numerous campaign
books. Combining this information, I presented the following suggestions
for viewing the Mondale/Reagan debates.
The goals criteria approach suggests that voters gain insight by perceiving
a debate as a process, not as a single, independent activity. Rather than
watching only the debate, viewers are asked to examine pre-debate pos
turing by campaign officials, party leaders, and media commentators. De
bates in 1980 and 1984 demonstrated the abundance of pre-debate dis
course in both the print and electronic media. Using these strategic
pronouncements to identify salient issues and goals for the debate, the
viewer should be better equipped to evaluate the actual encounter as well
* Jeff Greenfield, The Real Campaign (New York: Summit Books) 26.
^ Greenfield 245-47.
' For an analysis of why the "TV debates" will probably continue to proliferate, see
Kurt Ritter, "A Television Perspective on Presidential Debates: The View from 1984,"
Texas Speech Communication Association annual meeting, Austin, Texas, 6 Oct. 1984.
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as the post-debate efforts by both candidates to define the reasons for
victory (or loss). In simple terms, the goals approach can be detailed in four
steps:
1. Observe pre-debate analysis (in newspaper, television, and radio re
ports), paying attention to both media and partisan speakers.
2. Watch the debate and decide if each speaker has met his or her goals.
3. Examine post-debate analysis (expert and partisan) to determine the
"consensus" of who "won" and who "lost" the debate.
4. Determine from our individual perspective which candidate success
fully achieved his or her goals in the debate.
If the public were made aware of the goals approach in time to use it
while viewing the debate process, there would be at least five possible
benefits. First, viewers would be brought into the debate process as active
participants. Instead of viewing ninety minutes of debate as a passive ob
server, the voter would be encouraged to seek information to put the en
counter in a clear context. As a result, the voter could see the issues in the
debate emerging from the overall campaign. From this perspective, the
debates can be seen for what they really are, an important component of a
much larger event. Debates may change votes, alter momentum, but they
are not in themselves the stuff of victory or defeat.
Second, the debaters would establish their own criteria for analysis through
pre-debate rhetoric and surrogate assessments. By establishing possible is
sues, strategies, and goals, the candidates would attempt to set a standard
that would give them an advantage in the debate. The goals perspective
emphasizes the candidates rather than evaluating the contest from a list of
designated guidelines.
Third, the goals approach asks voters to withhold immediate judgment.
In doing so, the viewer can better assess the conflicting claims that may be
made in the debate. In 1980, both campaigns had staffs ready to answer
questions raised by candidate claims; and in 1984, the Reagan campaign
announced before the debate that any errors would be clarified. Moreover,
the news media offer detailed assessments of conflicting factual statements
made in the debate.'
Fourth, this perspective allows for a win-lose, win-win, or lose-lose judg
ment by the viewers. By basing the final evaluation on the goals, the per
spective rejects the horse race notion that one person must always win and
one always lose in the encounter. Some analysts, for example, point out that
in 1976, both Carter and Ford gained from their debate, suggesting the
possibility of a win-win situation. Stephan Lesher, Patrick Caddell, and Ger
ald Rafshoon reported that the 1976 debates "helped both candidates by
diminishing, if not eradicating, the general public's negative perceptions of
each." In their words:
Thus, the debates offered Carter the opportunity to appear for uninter
rupted chunks of time before the electorate and discuss matters of sub
stance—and thereby demonstrate that he was neither weird nor fuzzy on
' See David E. Rosenbaum, "Candidates Misstated Some 'Facts' in Debate," Houston
Chronicle 10 Oct. 1984, sec. 1; 10.
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the issues. For Ford, the debates gave him a chance to demonstrate he had
a command of the presidency and of the issues.'
The other extreme, a debate involving two candidates who both muddle
the issues and fail to give voters reason to vote for them, could be subject
to a lose-lose judgment.
Fifth, the goals approach helps viewers to better assess media evaluations
of the debate. Because television and newspaper commentators often base
their analysis upon pre-debate posturing, the viewer would understand more
clearly why specific conclusions might be drawn regarding who won and
lost the debate. Making a judgment on a similar basis, the viewer could
accept or reject the conclusions advanced by the journalists. The important
point is that viewers would have some idea why Dan Rather called the
debate a tie, a victory, or a loss.
A look at the 1980 presidential debate suggests that pre-debate rhetoric
shaped media expectations, that candidates employed explicit strategies to
achieve their goals, and that post-debate commentary reflected the media's
acceptance of such goals. One week before the debate, Pat Caddell told
Carter what he must accomplish to win the debate and the election. In
summary, the president had to emphasize Reagan's flaws and downplay his
own record in the White House.' Carter needed to talk about the future
and ignore the past. Significantly, the Carter campaign made their goals
known to the media. In a memo to Carter, Caddell gave this advice:
Setting expectations is a critical game in debates particularly with the press,
it is also with the public—usually the candidate expected to do well will
"lose"—does not meet expectation The more crucial and dangerous game
is thai with the press. They have an inordinate role in convincing the public not
only about who won on "points" but more critically, on the nature of the debate
itself.
Caddell suggested that to achieve victory in the eyes of the press and the
public, the Carter staff had to set the criteria for judgment; "Thus, we can
not let the press go into the debate with the simple notion of looking just
for a winner and loser. Nor with the idea that both will do well. Not only
must we win on points, more importantly we must win substantively and
have the press judge the debate on that criterion." After posing typical
questions to give to the press, he concluded that "This is a crucial area. It
cannot be overemphasized.""' Not only did Carter have to win the en
counter, but he had to shape an evaluative framework for the public as well.
The "debate about the debate," or "meta-debaling," recognized as crucial
by some observers, helps to confirm the assumption that a goals approach
may be useful for viewers."
Reagan's goals for the debate were similarly straightforward. As a memo
to Reagan advised: if the "Governor succeeds Tuesday in making Jimmy
' Stephan Lesher, with Patrick Caddell and Gerald Rafshoon, "Did the Debates Help
Jimmy Carter?" The Past and Future of Presidential Debates 139.
' Patrick Caddell, memo to Jimmy Carter, 21 Oct. 1980, printed in Elizabeth Drew,
Portrait of an Election {New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 410-39.
Caddell, memo to Carter 436.
" For an analysis of "the debate about the debate," see Myles Martel, Political
Campaign Debates (New York: Longman, 1983) 150-72.
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Carter's record the major issue of the debate and campaign, we will succeed
In the debate and win the general election. If however. Carter makes Ronald
Reagan the Issue of the debate and campaign, we will lose both." Thus,
Reagan's advisors wanted the candidate to show his competence and to
destroy his Image of being a saber rattler. Myles Martel, an advisor to Rea
gan, summarized how the debate was to overcome these obstacles. "Reagan
felt, and no one disagreed, that he could defuse his 'dangerous' Image by
remaining presidential. This could be accomplished by his projecting an
overall good-natured approach to the debate, by focusing as much as pos
sible on Carter's domestic failures ... and by allowing Carter to establish
the attack tone of the debate." Moreover, aides to Reagan claimed that he
did not have to dominate the encounter to win. A memo relayed this con
clusion: "The goal of this debate Is to perform very respectably. Therefore
we do not seek to hit a home run or to win the World Serles."^^
Media accounts revealed that the pre-debate message was filtering out.
Newsweek (24 October) predicted that Carter would demonstrate his com
petence while Reagan would show "presidential timber." The CBS Morning
News reported that "Carter will show the sharp differences, the stark dif
ferences," between himself and his challenger. On the Today Show, Robert
Strauss claimed that Carter would hammer away at the "stark differences,"
and Rosalynn Carter suggested that her husband would point out the "stark
differences" between himself and Reagan. On the other hand, Edwin Meese
claimed that Reagan would concentrate on the "economic Issue." More
Important from the view of the Republican campaign, Tom Pettit and Jack
Germond declared on the Today Show "that Reagan would gain points just
by standing on an equal footing with Carter."" By the beginning of the
debate, the media had set the expectation for a battle pitting a display of
"stark differences" against a showing of "presidential timber."
Post-debate reports suggest that the criteria articulated by both camps
had been adopted by many critics as a standard for evaluation. According
to the Los Angeles Times, "Presidential was the most used word In the post-
debate analysis on the three networks at 11:30 p.m. and on public tv earlier.
Whether a candidate was perceived as 'presidential' became critical." More
over, the print reaction mirrored televised conclusions. According to
Greenfield, "The Initial press responses tended to produce the same analysis
as the networks: no clear winner, pretty much of a draw, which favored
Ronald Reagan by making him appear 'Presidential.'" Many national opinion
leaders said the same thing. William Safire, Anthony Lewis, Hedrick Smith,
James Reston, Joseph Kraft, Martin Schram, and David Broder seemed to
agree that a tie In the debate went to Reagan."
" Richard WIrthiln, Richard Bea!,and Myles Martel, memo to Ronald Reagan, print
ed in Martel, Poiiticai 19. Myles Martel, "Debate Preparations in the Reagan Camp:
An insider's View," Speaker and Gave/ 18 (1981): 41. James Baker and Myles Martel,
memo to Ronald Reagan, printed in Martel, Political 19.
" See Greenfield 232-34.
" Howard Rosenberg, Los Angeles Times 30 Oct. 1980, sec. VI: 1. See William Safire,
New York Times 30 Oct. 1980, sec. A: 27; Anthony Lewis, New York Times 30 Oct.
1980, sec. A: 27; Hedrick Smith, New York Times 29 Oct. 1980, sec. A: 1; James Reston,
New York Times 29 Oct. 1980, sec. A: 31; Joseph Kraft, Washington Post 30 Oct. 1980,
sec. A: 23; Martin Schram, Washington Post 1 Nov. 1980, sec. A: 1; and David Broder,
Washington Post 29 Oct. 1980, sec. A: 1.
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The importance of post-debate commentary was reflected by the planned
responses of both camps. Surrogate speakers infiltrated the airwaves at
tempting to explain how each candidate met his goals. The post-debate
strategy was clearly planned. As Caddell wrote to Carter:
We must have post-debate follow-through a la the expectation section. We
must push the idea of victory of substance, depth, specific answers. We
cannot accede to the idea of just who won or lost. "We won but we won
because." We must hit Reagan hard, immediately, for not answering, lack of
knowledge, etc. This will obviously be easier if the press is pre-conditioned
themselves.
Ironically, the Carter campaign failed to execute its surrogate strategy very
effectively."
Days after the election, a second wave of more in-depth analyses was
offered to explain who won the debate. Surprisingly, james Golden and
Goodwin Berquist report that these efforts were still short of critical insight.
The press continued to provide superficial commentary. Golden and Ber
quist conclude that because debates are media events, delivery, appearance,
and overall manner proved more important than substance, in both the
immediate and the long-term feedback." Television thrives on images. That
the concepts of "presidential" and "dangerous" are easily conveyed in im
ages explains the media's delivery and image-centered perspective. Hence,
warmth, formality, and humor become the standards the media employ to
judge the debates.
However, the qualities of "presidential" and "dangerous" do not neces
sarily have to be evaluated in terms of delivery. Instead, legitimate policy
questions ("How would you handle terrorism?" "What will lead you to ne
gotiate an arms-control agreement?") may also demonstrate a candidate's
"presidential" or "dangerous" qualities. Carter's plan to reveal the "stark
differences" between himself and Reagan suggested that if voters really
understood how far apart the men were on the basic issues, they would
settle for another four years of Carter.
A review of the 1984 presidential debates confirms that the goals criteria
perspective can provide insight for voters. Examining pre-debate comments
by both candidates reveals their obvious effort to guide expectations for
the debate. A month before the first encounter, the Mondale campaign
called attention to Reagan's isolation from the public and the press. "I think
a candidate has an obligation to be available not only to the public but to
the press," declared James Johnson. Mondale's goal for the debates was to
bring about an "engagement." According to Tom Donilon, a Mondale aide,
the Democratic candidate "knew that if he was going to win the general
" See Jack Germond and Jules Witcover, B/ue Smoke and Mirrors: Why Reagan Won
and Carter Lost in the Election of 1980 (New York: Viking Press, 1981) 282: "Afterward
the Carter strategists tried to peddle to reporters the notion that the President had
won because he had delineated 'the stark differences' between himself and Reagan.
'Talking points' were sent out to state campaign coordinators to make the same
argument to visiting reporters, and many did—often using exactly the same phrases,
unwittingly revealing that they were spewing out the campaign line dictated from
Washington." See also Caddell, memo to Carter 437.
"Goodwin F. Berquist and James L. Golden, "Media Rhetoric, Criticism, and the
Public Perception of the 1980 Presidential Debates," Quartedy iournal of Speech 67
(1981): 132.
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election It would have to be in a face-to-face confrontation with Ronald
Reagan. That became particularly true as we went into September and saw
the Reagan strategy of non-engagement with Mondale, of treating Mondale
like he did not exist." As a seasoned politician, Mondale certainly realized
that when a candidate becomes a nonperson (Barry Goldwater in 1964,
George McGovern in 1972), his ability to maintain striking distance is se
verely curtailed. Accordingly, Mondale made it clear that he would "en
gage" the president. The New York Times reported that Mondale had been
advised "that the electorate has not yet been engaged in this campaign."
To reinforce the campaign's goal, Johnson announced that in the debates,
the Democratic candidate had two goals: "Mostly, we want to engage the
electorate," show that Mondale is in "touch with the concerns of the av
erage American family." Second, Mondale would stress Reagan's lack of
leadership. Reporting that Mondale had changed his tactics, Hedrick Smith
also advanced the theme of leadership as a criterion for the debate. He
quoted Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas, who observed that "The lead
ership thing is just beginning to come through." Indeed, Smith concluded,
"The leadership issue has become the crucial touchstone for Mr. Mondale."
Democratic strategists told Smith that for the first time in the campaign,
their candidate was beginning to "tarnish Mr. Reagan's aura of leadership."^'
Reagan aides returned to a tactic they had employed quite successfully
in 1980: claiming that the president needed only a tie to win. In fact, some
campaign officials worked to minimize the importance of the debate. Cam
paign director Ed Rollins claimed that voter apathy was of greater concern
to him than the outcome of the debate. As the debate neared, both can
didates reflected their strategic goals through their campaign appearances.
Mondale sought to engage Reagan to make the race reflect two distinct
views of government. In contrast, Reagan refused to mention Mondale by
name, attacking the "terrible economic difficulties" and the "decline" and
"defeatism" of the Carter administration.^® The morning of the debate, Rob
ert Beckel appeared on ABC's This Week with David Brinkiey and announced
that Mondale would use the debate to "engage the electorate." Similar
sentiments were echoed by James Johnson on Face the Nation and Richard
Leone on Meet the Press.^^
Viewers who carefully observed the media accounts knew that Reagan
hoped to get through the debate without committing a gaffe. Mondale, on
the other hand, wanted to engage the electorate and Reagan, show that the
president was incompetent, and capture some of Reagan's aura of leader
ship. This strategy seemed the only hope of shifting the campaign's mo
mentum from the Republicans to the Democrats.
National opinion leaders agreed that Mondale accomplished a large mea-
"Reagan Is in Isolation, Mondaie Aide Asserts," New York Times 8 Sept. 1984, sec.
A: 9. Doniion, quoted in Jack W. Germond and Juies Witcover, Wake Us When It's
Over (New York: Macmillan, 1985) 493. Phil Gaiiey, "Reagan and Mondale Polish
Debate Strategy," New York Times 4 Oct. 1984, sec. A: 14. Hedrick Smith, "Mondale
Tactics; Shift to New Arena," New York Times 4 Oct. 1984, sec. A: 15.
" Rollins, quoted in Gaiiey. Reagan, quoted in Bernard Weinraub, "Making Cam
paign Crowds Feel Good," New York Times 5 Oct. 1984, sec. A: 13.
" Robert Beckei, This Week with David Brinkiey, 7 Oct. 1984.
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sure of his goal. Smith of the New York Times observed that the debate gave
Mondale an "opportunity to engage Mr. Reagan for the first time in give-
and-take about his record and his future agenda." In addition, Mondale
"confronted doubts about his own leadership qualities with a strong, con
fident performance. On the issues, he kept the President largely on the
defensive, explaining his record." To further support the idea of an en
gagement, Beckel claimed that Mondale "got on a level table with Ronald
Reagan tonight and beat him." The next morning on the Today Show, Beckel
bragged that they had an "engaged debate." Leone also characterized the
debate as a successful engagement. "What's on the table are all our issues,"
he noted. "It's our issues against his color scheme." Mondale himself em
phasized the theme, claiming that he had "smoked out" Reagan's real plan
to cut Social Security. "Maybe the President is out of touch with the impact
of his policies," he observed. "Maybe he doesn't understand what he's
done. We need a President who knows what's going on." In contrast, offi
cials in the Reagan campaign attempted to explain how they won the de
bate. "I think the President won," insisted James Baker, "because Mondale
had to score a knockout to win the debate.... Even if we did as poorly as
a draw, we won."^°
Reagan's problems answering questions brought up another issue that had
been simmering in the minds of some Democrats—the president's age. From
a goals perspective, the age issue became salient after the first debate, as
commentators and partisans attempted to analyze what had happened.
Television reports started to advance the age issue the next morning. Al
Hunt of the Wall Street Journal told the CBS Morning News that Reagan
seemed "rusty" and offered a "striking contrast" to his strong performance
in the 1980 presidential debate. On the Today Show, Bryant Gumbal cited
"Democrats" who said that the president appeared "halting, confused, and
tired" in the encounter. On the same newscast, John Chancellor observed
that Reagan had "tired visibly" by the end of the debate. By the third day
of post-debate reaction, the age issue was on the nation's headlines. As the
Houston Post proclaimed: "Democrats Rap Reagan on Age Issue." And in
the words of the Houston Chronicle: "Debate Raises Reagan's Age As Issue
in Presidential Race." Representatives Claude Pepper and Tony Coelho both
raised the issue of age. Thus, the issue continued to escalate. One of the
debate questioners, James Weighart, said it was apparent "to him and the
others on stage that Reagan visibly tired near the end of the 90-minute
session," while Newsday reported that Reagan's performance was "halting,
defensive and tired.
James Reston offered an explanation for the relevancy of the age issue
when he implied that "age" served as a euphemism for "incompetence."
2®Hedrick Smith, "Debate; A Bolder Mondale and an Incumbent on the Defen
sive," New York Times 9 Oct. 1984, sec. A: 20. Bernard Weinraub, "Mondale Presses
Reagan on Benefits," New York Times 10 Oct. 1984, sec. A: 12. Howell Raines, "Chance
of Revival Seen for Mondale After TV Debate," New York Times 9 Oct. 1984, sec.
A: 1.
" See the Houston Post 10 Oct. 1984, sec. A: 1 and the Houston Chronicle 10 Oct.
1984, sec. 1; 10. Pepper and Coelho were quoted in both newspapers. Weighart and
Newsday were quoted in the Houston Chronicle.
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Arguing that the debate exposed no problems with Reagan's age, Reston
charged that the debate exposed the president's mind. "This is what has
been covered up in the last four years by his amiable personality, and his
superb reading of speeches from invisible mirrors," noted Reston. He con
cluded that while public debating is "not a good test for Presidents ...
mastering the facts and details of complicated issues is.""
To explain Reagan's poor performance in the first debate, campaign of
ficials told of the president's being "brutalized" by over-preparation. Close
friend Senator Paul Laxalt criticized those who had changed Reagan's natural
style of confrontation. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported that "In
tensive debate rehearsals brought to Louisville a president confused by
notebooks full of statistics and short of any vision." George Will echoed
those sentiments, telling his readers that Reagan had "passively accepted
the discipline of elaborate preparation" but had failed to decide what vision
to communicate to the voters. Implying that the age issue was a moot point.
Will argued that Reagan had always had ups and downs as a campaigner:
"What you saw in Louisville was the Reagan of the stumbling 1980 campaign
between the convention and Labor Day; and of the 1976 campaign against
President Ford, between the New Hampshire and North Carolina prima
ries.""
What is the benefit of assessing the first debate from a goals framework?
Most observers agreed that Mondale had won the debate, even though the
immediate press reaction was not as absolute as the Democrats' claims of
victory seemed. The goals approach helps viewers to understand how Mon
dale seemed to gain the consensus. In terms of engagement, Mondale forced
the president to commit himself on Social Security and to refute numerous
attacks on his record. Moreover, Mondale symbolically engaged Reagan by
asking him the question "Do you remember the last time you said, 'There
you go again'?" This question, along with Mondale's subsequent charge that
Reagan had misled the public regarding Medicare cuts, clearly engaged the
president. Although some critics might call the question a trick, Mondale's
tactic forced the president to listen to an apparent contradiction between
his rhetoric and his policy making. As a result, Mondale engaged the pres
ident and called into question Reagan's competence by provoking the age
issue.
Reaction to the second presidential debate, both media and surrogate,
indicates that Mondale failed to keep Reagan engaged. Employing his often-
used tactic of humor, Reagan disposed of age questions by holding his own
on the issues and by joking about his opponent's age. By competing on the
same level with Mondale, the president diminished attacks upon his age
and competence. Part of his success probably stemmed from the fact that
viewers had questioned his capability after the first debate. Aides to the
president were "delighted to have him enter [the] arena an underdog rather
" James Reston, "The Age Issue," New York Times 10 Oct. 1984, sec. A: 27.
" Laxalt, quoted in Goldman and Fuller 321. He charged that Reagan's coaching
team had "brutalized" the president with over-preparation and under-confidence.
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Change in the Wind," Houston Post 10 Oct. 1984,
sec. B: 2. George Will, "Despite Lead, Reagan Should Play Offense," Houston Chronicle
10 Oct. 1984, sec. II: 10.
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than a favorite in the debate." Because of Reagan's problems In Louisville,
Hedrick Smith reasoned that "in Kansas City the yardstick was considerably
less demanding."" Agreeing that Reagan performed better in the second
debate, many Democrats attempted to define a margin of victory for their
candidate. Governor Charles Robb of Virginia claimed that Mondale "scored
the substantive points and dealt with the facts very well," while New York's
Governor Mario Cuomo observed that Mondale was a "clear winner" on
the "merits and issues." Calling the debate "even-steven," Governor Harry
Hughes of Maryland suggested that throughout the debate, "Mondale
showed a greater knowledge of the facts than the president.""
John Dillin of the Christian Science Monitor demonstrated what most me
dia analysts were reporting about the debate. He suggested that "political
experts" had three conclusions about the Reagan/Mondale encounter: 1)
the president needed a draw to be satisfied, and he achieved that goal; 2)
Mondale needed a decisive victory similar to the first debate, but he failed
to achieve that goal; and 3) Reagan was far ahead in the opinion polls before
the debate, and he was ahead after the debate." The conclusion that the
debate was a tie resulted in part from the numerous public opinion polls
taken after the debate. Significantly, most major polls gave Reagan a slight
victory.''
Both Reagan and Mondale sought to use post-debate attention to artic
ulate their claims of victory. Reagan returned to a popular theme during
the Republican convention—that the Democrats wanted a weak America.
As he observed the day after the debate, "Those who believe a weaker
America is a safer America have no business guiding the destiny of our
nation." Rather than continuing to ignore Mondale, the president attacked
the challenger's record. Listing the various weapons systems that Mondale
voted against in the Senate, Reagan concluded that if Mondale had been
successful, "America would barely have any defense, any real means to
protect the peace, any chance to preserve freedom." Meanwhile, Mondale
kept quoting Reagan's debate responses to prove that the president was
not an able leader. Calling Reagan the "most detached, the most remote,
the most uninformed president in modern history," Mondale cited specific
Issues brought up in the debate that supported such conclusions." While
he admitted that Reagan "didn't do as poorly" in the second debate as in
the first, Mondale argued that the second debate revealed "an American
president who cannot discuss any major issue without making a major mis
take.""
" Hedrick Smith, "Aftermath of Debate," New York Times 24 Oct. 1984, sec. A: 14.
" "At! Agree Reagan Better," Houston Post 22 Oct. 1984, sec. A: 1.
»|ohn Dillin, "K.C. Likely Last Chance for Mondale," Houston Post 23 Oct. 1984,
sec. B: 5.
" See Paul West, "Reagan Holds Lead in Post-debate Polls," Dallas rimes-Herald 10
Oct. 1984, sec. A: 1. The CBS, ABC, Newsweek, USA Today, and Dallas Times-Herald
polls all gave Reagan the victory.
»jerry Wiessler, "Dem Nominee Labels Incumbent A Shirker," Houston Chronicle
23 Oct. 1984, sec. L: 14.
" Kathy Kiely, "Mondale Claims Drift to Combat," Houston Post 23 Oct. 1984, sec.
A: 3.
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How can we explain Mondaie's failure to win the "decisive victory" or
"score a knockout" in light of the fact that many experts believed he won
on the issues? By using the goals perspective, voters may be able to explain
this paradox, even if they disagree with the experts' conclusions. In other
words, understanding how opinion leaders analyzed the debate may illu
minate the apparent consensus in the media. Mary McGrory claimed that
Reagan was able to be judged on his own terms in the second debate, using
"quips and quotes and one-liners and comebacks." However, Mondale ap
peared too cautious as well. According to McGrory, Mondale "obviously
did not want to tangle with Reagan at close quarters." Noting that Mondale
handled the second debate "perfectly well," McGrory complained that "the
genial, nimble-witted, surefooted self he presented in Louisville was sup
planted by the cautious politician of melancholy memory.''^" George Will
implied that Mondale had lost his mission of engagement; he suggested that
Mondale was obsessed with himself, using the words strength and strong
thirty-nine times and the word knowledge twenty-one times.'^ Because the
general public pays little attention to the post-debate debate, observed
Edwin Yoder, Reagan probably appeared to be the winner to many people.
Voder suggested that at first glance, the president's "responses were deft,
and brilliantly crafted for the limited attention level of television." More
carefully analyzed after the debate, Reagan's answers "give substance to the
suspicion that the President is uncommonly relaxed, underinformed and
imprecise about vital matters of detail."^^
Reaction to the second debate demonstrated general consensus among
the media. Ted Knapp of the Scripps-Howard News Service observed that
Reagan "eased doubts about his ability to think on his feet for 90 minutes."
Although Mondale did well, he did not "score the knockout he needed."
Larry Eichel of the Knight-Ridder Newspapers suggested that the president
"seemed in command of his own arguments, generally responding to ques
tions asked of him with forceful and documented defenses of his adminis
tration's record." According to Loye Miller, Jr., of the Newhouse News
Service, Mondale needed to "show up Reagan again, either with a superior
performance or another weak showing by tbe president." However, con
cluded Miller, "That did not seem to happen." Robert Shogan of the Los
Angeles Times reported that Reagan "appeared to reassure those who might
have begun to worry about his age or his commitment to peace." Although
Mondale probably won by "technical debating standards," Shogan added,
'in political terms he seemed to fall short of the kind of decisive victory
that seemed necessary if he is to overcome Reagan's still-substantial lead in
the polls."^^ Such conclusions reveal an important characteristic of political
debate evaluation: ascertaining the political realities of the situation, as de-
Mary McGrory, "Reagan Sounds Retreat to Rival," San Antonio Express-News 24
Oct. 1984, sec. B: 7.
George Will, "Mondale Keeps Up the Strength 'Message,'" San Antonio Lisht 24
Oct. 1984, sec. B: 7.
Edwin Yoder, Jr., "Peace is Confusing Business for Reagan," San Antonio Light 24
Oct. 1984, sec. B: 7.
" Knap, Eichel, Miller, and Shogan printed in "How Political Analysts Saw the Rea-
gan-Mondale Debate," Houston Chronicle 23 Oct. 1984, sec. 1: 6.
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fined by the media and the candidates. David Broder provided an insightful
assessment of the debate, taking this notion into consideration. "An awful
lot of voters just wanted to know that Reagan had not lost his faculties-
including his sense of humor—before they followed their Inclination to give
him another term," he reported. If the debate had been between two chal
lengers for the presidency, Mondale could have been pleased with his per
formance. "But this debate," observed Broder, "occurred 45 months after
Reagan became president and two weeks before the election. It was hardly
a contest of equals." Noting the president's problems in the second debate,
including his rambling closing statement, Broder pointed out that most vot
ers "were predisposed by the events of the past 45 months to grant Reagan
a second term—unless he did something that made them distinctly uncom
fortable doing so." Reagan's problems in the debate "may well be ration
alized away by those voters who want to give Reagan another four years.
So long as he did not disgrace himself—and he did not."^^
Does the goals criteria approach offer insight into the 1984 debates? I
think that it can help voters appreciate and understand the process of de
bates in the context of the presidential campaign. If speech communication
teachers were to take such a framework to various audiences in an election
year, a higher degree of interest and rationality could be advanced. Rather
than training viewers to be debate critics from an academic model, we can
use the goals approach to provide an alternative to passive viewing. The
goals criteria will probably not change the manner in which many Americans
look at presidential debates—they do not desire any more information about
politics or politicians. But there may be individuals and groups (our students
and colleagues, for example), who could benefit from a systematic method
of watching such encounters. The alternative of maintaining our present
approach only promotes the shouting match every four years over the value
of debates in the political process. People committed to the cause of public
communication realize that a middle ground exists between those who dis
miss the debates and those who sanctify the contests. We must teach in
terested Americans that understanding the debates requires healthy doses
of patience, interest, and skepticism. Our discipline has knowledge to share;
making the commitment and finding the forums seem to be the obstacles.
I hope that before the hallowed words presidential debate are uttered again,
members of the speech communication field will be working on their public
service presentations.
David S. Broder, "Reagan Disposed of Age Issue," Houston Cf»ron/c/e 23 Oct. 1984,
sec. 3: 16.
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PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES: POLITICAL
TOOL OR VOTER INFORMATION?
Mary M. Gill
The media have for decades been a topic of discussion. Scholars debate
about how the media affect voter opinion. Joseph Wagner contends that
the media alter voter attitude. He reports that the media produce consistent
and systematic effects on public opinion.^ James Clotfelter and Charles Prysby
report that television is now the most important medium.^ Theodore White
describes television as the "great transmission belt of impression."^ Regard
less of the documented effect of television, most critics agree that it does
exert an influence on viewers. Recently the media's coverage of presidential
debates has come into question. Scholars report varied results on the mea
surable effect of televised presidential debates on voters. What is generally
agreed on is that voters are influenced, although this influence may only
strengthen existing conviction. Wagner reports that a general increase in
information about the candidates occurs because of both the reinforcement
and the altering of attitudes for a significant number of voters." Given that
televised debates wield a degree of influence, the presidential debate pro
cess needs reform so that information can be transferred to voters without
a political weapon being created. I intend to demonstrate that the debates
have had an influence on the elections and to propose that reforms must
be made in the format of these debates.
Presidential debates were first held in 1960. This year offered a number
of exceptions. Section 315 of the Communications Act, which provides
equal air time for all candidates, was suspended by Congress to allow John
Kennedy and Richard Nixon to debate. Because Kennedy and Nixon were
only two of the candidates, a special provision was needed. This suspension
of Section 315 proved to be a single occurrence. It was not until sixteen
years later that presidential debates were held. Only after an independent
group, the League of Women Voters, became responsible for the debates
were they allowed to take place. In 1976, Congress would not suspend
Section 315. However, the Federal Communications Commission ruled that
if an independent group hosted the debates, the media could report the
event as a news event. Thus, Section 315 and the equal time provision were
not contested. It was under this situation that the presidential debates of
1976, 1980, and 1984 took place.
In each of the debates, the format remained similar. News correspondents
Mary M. Gill is Instructor and Director of Forensics at the University of
North Dakota.
^ Joseph Wagner, American Journal of Political Science Aug. 1983: 426.
' James Clotfelter and Charles L. Prysby, Political Choices: A Study of Elections and
Voters (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980) 3.
^ Theodore White, America in Search of Itself (New York: Harper and Row, 1982)
389.
" Wagner 409.
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asked candidates questions regarding various issues and concerns of the
day. In each debate, the amount of time given the candidate to respond to
the question remained rather short. In the 1984 debates, each candidate
was given two and one-half minutes to initially respond to a question.
Opening and closing remarks of varying lengths were utilized in each of the
debate series.
Although the debates have undergone changes, the influence and effect
of the debates have remained similar. When each of the debates is analyzed,
an interesting parallel emerges. In each instance, the media's reported and
perceived winner of the presidential debate also won the general election.
In 1960, the debate was held before an estimated audience of 65-70 million
people. The debate between Kennedy and Nixon was perceived by the
media and viewers as a close debate. In the final analysis, however. It was
determined that because of his command and charisma, Kennedy won the
debate. He also later won the election.'
As the debates continued in 1976, the number of viewers Increased. It is
estimated that as many as 100 million people viewed the Gerald Ford and
jimmy Carter debates.^ During the 1976 election, surveys of previously un
committed voters showed that the debates influenced their ultimate voting
decision and provided an impetus for them to vote at all in the election.
Moreover, both candidates in the debates viewed them as the turning point
in the campaign. Carter felt if it had not been for the debates, he would
have lost the election. Ford also theorized that the debates were a major
factor in the outcome of the election.' The media reported Carter as the
stronger of the two men during the debates. As in 1960, the perceived
winner of the debates won the election.
In 1980, a new situation developed in the presidential election, john An
derson, a candidate for the Republican nomination, ran in the general elec
tion as an independent candidate. Although Anderson held substantial pub
lic support and wished to debate Carter and Reagan, both candidates refused
to debate him. Carter asserted that Anderson had no party or candidacy to
claim. Reagan suggested that he would debate Anderson after Carter agreed
to debate Anderson. Carter, who continued to refuse to debate Anderson,
did extend an invitation to debate Reagan. The Carter campaigners hoped
that this strategy would be effective. By having their candidate debate Rea
gan, they hoped to create the impression that there were only two serious
candidates in the election, for they feared that Anderson might split the
vote in November. The strategy was unsuccessful. The 1980 presidential
debates were perhaps among the closest. On points about various issues of
the day. Carter and Reagan were judged equally effective. However, Reagan
was perceived as the winner based on personality and the image presented
during the debates.® As in the past, the perceived winner of the debates
won the election that followed.
'White 401.
'White 401.
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In 1984, the incumbent Reagan initially stated that he would not debate
Democratic nominee Waiter Mondale. Later in the campaign, when it be
came apparent to the Reagan campaign staff that the choice was to debate
or to appear weak, they decided the debate must take place. Reagan said
he would debate if the event could be arranged to accommodate his sched
ule. This debate series demonstrates the exteht to which debates have be
come yet one more political tool for a candidate. The dates agreed upon
for the debates between Reagan and Mondale did accommodate the presi
dent's schedule, but they also conflicted with other major events. The first
debate was scheduled on the night of a major Mondale fund-raiser; it proved
disastrous for Reagan. The media declared Mondale the winner of this first
debate, claiming that Reagan was out of control, uncomfortable, and lacking
in knowledge of significant affairs. The second debate was televised oppo
site a National Football League game. The Reagan campaign hoped that the
football game would draw viewers away from the debates. Reagan also
changed his appearance for the second debate. He appeared more at ease
with the situation and able to handle the questions and Mondale's re
sponses. The second debate reversed the viewers' perception of Reagan,
and Reagan was reported as the victor. Moreover, based on his extraordi
nary performance change between the debates, Reagan was considered by
the media to be the winner of the series of debates. In the final analysis,
the Reagan campaign's strategies were effective.^ Once again, the candidate
perceived as the winner of the debates won the following election.
Thus, the presidential debates have become merely another political tool.
But that is not their only shortcoming. When the basic debate structure is
analyzed, a number of problems become apparent. For example, news cor
respondents have participated in the debates by asking questions of the
candidates—questions that often do not reflect the concern of the public
but rather the biases of the questioners. Such was the case during the Car
ter/Ford debates in 1976. In addition, the questions asked by various cor
respondents have overlapped questions previously asked during the debate.
As a result, many questions have seemed pointless in acquiring new infor
mation about the candidates' positions on issues. With the format focusing
on questions asked, the exchanges have often appeared as "two ships pass
ing in the night." Little direct exchange is made between the candidates.
Consequently, much of the debate appears tedious at best. Furthermore,
the format has fostered the misuse of information: the setting creates an
artificial environment; and the candidates are hesitant to use any material
because appearing unknowledgeable could cost the election. Therefore,
rather than referring to notes and/or campaign documents, the candidate
repeats information to the best of his recollection. Misinformation becomes
introduced as fact. This occurred occasionally during the Reagan/Mondale
debates.
The presidential debates seem to play an important role in the election
process, and it appears that they are here to stay. Thus, it seems reasonable
that the debate process should be changed to increase fairness and to assure
"Debating the Debates," Time 1 Oct. 1984: 23.
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the communication of accurate information. Changes in both the format
and the content of the debates need to be made. Initially, the candidates
debating should be given a desk so that they can sit rather than stand for
the ninety minutes. Reporters have often interpreted movement as discom
fort with the procedure when in fact it was merely discomfort from standing
for the extended period of time. Additionally, the candidates should have
campaign information and statistics at their disposal. This change would
facilitate a more realistic impression of the candidates. Few Americans be
lieve that the president has committed to memory all the data relevant to
every decision he makes. Rather, the president refers to information pro
vided by his or her advisors. Candidates in presidential debates should be
given the same opportunity.
In regard to the basic format of the debates, both the time limit and the
subject matter should be changed. In the past, the debates have lasted
ninety minutes. A presidential debate should last no longer than forty-five
minutes. For a debate to serve as an effective information tool, its organizers
must focus on the listener. That is, viewers would benefit more from the
debates if each debate were shorter and if the number of debates were
greater. Viewers would be able to grasp and, it is hoped, retain more of the
information if it were presented more compactly. And reducing the length
of each debate would allow for more debates to occur.
I suggest that more debates of shorter duration occur between the major
party candidates. These debates should focus on issues grouped into issue
areas. For example, a series of three debates could be held between the
presidential candidates. Each debate would focus on a different issue area
such as economic concerns, domestic concerns, and international concerns.
Within each of these issue areas, specific issues could be debated by the
candidates. During a debate on economic concerns, for instance, the can
didates could reasonably debate issues such as taxes and inflation.
I further propose that news correspondents no longer appear to ask ques
tions of the candidates. In the past, various correspondents have asked can
didates a plethora of unrelated questions. A better format would involve a
moderator, perhaps a news correspondent agreed upon by both candidates.
The moderator would introduce the specific issues and direct the candi
dates' responses. Each candidate would be given an opportunity to offer his
or her analysis of the specific issue. This would allow the candidates an
opportunity to interact with one another in their responses, thus limiting
the talking past one another that has occurred in past debates.
With each debate in a series of three focusing on an issue area, each
candidate would be allowed five minutes for an opening remark relevant
to the issue area. For most of each debate, the moderator would direct
responses to questions on specific issues. Each candidate would be allowed
three minutes for a closing statement. To host a spirit of fair play, a flip of
a coin could determine the order in which the candidates would make their
opening and closing remarks.
Finally, the debates should be mandated by the party mechanism. Newton
Minow, former chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, rec
ommended this change in 1984 with the justification that the debates have
become too important of an information choice to allow them to continue
41
et al.: Complete Issue 24(1)
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 1986
40 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
to be used as a political tool." Present debate practices allow the debates
to become a political weapon. Much of the hoopla surrounding each debate
is generated not by what the candidates really say but by the impressions
and images they create even before the debate itself. Consequently, Section
315 of the Communications Act should be altered to allow the major party
candidates to debate. An explanation could be added to the section that
would exclude presidential debates from the equal time standard. The de
bates could then focus on information dispension and not on the percep
tion of strength or weakness in the extending or accepting of an offer to
debate.
In addition to mandating presidential debates, the party structure should
mandate a debate between the major-party vice presidential candidates.
Such a debate would provide the electorate an opportunity to assess the
leadership and character capabilities of the potential vice president.
Obviously, opinions vary regarding the measured significance the presi
dential debates provide. Analyses of the debates suggest that perceived
strength in the debate process is related to the outcome of the election.
With the electorate's reliance on information gained through the debate
process, it seems only reasonable that every effort be made to make the
process as bias-free and as accurate as possible. To this end, substantial
changes must be made in the format of future presidential debates.
" Newton Minow and Lee Mitchell, "Formalize Debates," New York Times 30 May
1984: A23.
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REBUILDING THE PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES
Stephen Mills
Thanks to the reelection of President Reagan, presidential debates will
almost certainly be held again in the final months of the 1988 election
campaign and are unlikely to include a White House incumbent. They will
thus be the first since 1960 to involve two challengers to the presidency.
This situation will provide a rare opportunity for debate advocates to
move swiftly to rebuild the structure of the debates. Debate organizers will
be free from the decisive influence the While House has exercised since
1952 in determining debate formats, indeed, in permitting debates to take
place at all. They will be dealing instead with non-incumbents who will be
unable to refuse the kind of mass exposure the debates offer.
The opportunity to rebuild the debates must be seized now to correct
three flaws that, in various forms, have dogged presidential debates since
their inception and that recurred sharply in 1984;
1) The League of Women Voters has a precarious hold on the sponsor
ship of the debates. Debate advocates must decide whether they want
League sponsorship to continue or whether they want to encourage
the television networks or some other group to take over.
2) The current content of the debates does not fulfill their stated aims.
Debate advocates must decide whether more specific content guide
lines are desirable and, if so, what guidelines.
3) The current format of the debates creates misconceptions about the
debating and electoral process and must be rectified.
This opportunity to rebuild the debates is unlikely to recur; if it is not
taken now, the current structure of the debates will likely become institu
tionalized and unchangeable. This paper begins with the assumption that
the presidential debates are a valuable addition to the electoral process but
that they need improvement, rebuilding.
Improvements will remain elusive while debate negotiations are left to
the last minute when the candidates' tactical interests are paramount. An
urgent first step must be to resolve the sponsorship problem. This paper
argues that the League's sponsorship is inadequate; a new sponsor—one
with resources, reputation, and rule-making clout—should be found or cre
ated immediately. Such a sponsor should through research and public dis
cussion determine improvements that are manifestly sensible, fair, and in
Stephen Mills is an Australian journalist with The Age newspaper of Mel
bourne. He recently spent two years in the United States as a Harkness
Fellow to observe the 1984 presidential election campaign.
The author wishes to thank the Benton Foundation and its president, Mr. Charles
Benton, for friendship and logistical support while this paper was being prepared late
in 1984, as well as the Commonwealth Fund of New York for invaluable support to
the author during his 1983-85 Harkness Fellowship in the United States. The views
expressed here are the author's alone.
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the public Interest. Debaters in 1988 should be presented with a fait accom
pli that they would find costlier to avoid than to accept.
Sponsor: The League versus
the Networks
I think the [CBS] debate shed more heat than light I was half expecting
one of them [the candidates] to reach across the table and punch the other
guy out. [Mrs. Dorothy Ridings, president, League of Women Voters^
The role of the League of Women Voters Is to lend Its name, and pay for
the hall, and be the nominal conduit between the candidates, networks and
whatever panel there is.... To say "sponsor" is a misnomer. [Mr. Dick Wald,
ABC vice presidentf
The best behind-the-scenes story of the 1984 presidential debate series
concerns the rivalry between the League of Women Voters and the three
major television networks over who should sponsor the debates. The rivalry
culminated in a nearly successful attempt by the networks to replace the
League as sponsor and to produce the debates themselves.
This story, along with the saga of the blackballed panelists, illustrates the
increasingly precarious nature of the League's hold on the sponsorship role.
Those who wish to see debates continue must soon make a fundamental
choice about the future of debate sponsorship: for the 1988 debates, should
the League's role be strengthened, should the networks be encouraged to
take the League's place, or should a new sponsor be found or created?
The network bid for debate sponsorship originates with the 1983 revision
of Section 315 of the Communications Act. This ruling by the Federal Com
munications Commission was the first to allow networks to sponsor, as well
as to broadcast, candidate debates that were bona fide news events. The
new ruling, which completed the work of the FCC's 1976 Aspen ruling, was
contested in court unsuccessfully by the League.
Freed from the legal restraints that had effectively prevented network
sponsorship of debates since 1960, networks sponsored some debates under
a variety of formats during the 1984 Democratic primary season. One of
these, moderated by CBS anchor Dan Rather and featuring candidates Mon-
dale. Hart, and Jackson, was particularly memorable: tough, tense, fast. The
networks liked the format; the League's Dorothy Ridings did not.
In May, each network made unilateral approaches to representatives of
the Republican and Democratic parties seeking their cooperation in staging
the Main Event: a series of debates to be held in the fall between President
Reagan and his still-unselected Democratic opponent. In a conversation on
the matter between James Baker, White House chief of staff at the time,
and Dick Wald of ABC, Wald was asked to coordinate the requests of the
three networks to simplify the talks. As network point man, Wald continued
^ Dorothy Ridings, telephone interview, Nov. 1984. (Unless otherwise noted, all
attributions to Mrs. Ridings are based on this interview.)
^ Dick Wald, telephone interviews, Nov. 1984. (All attributions to Mr. Wald are
based on these interviews.)
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what he characterizes as a "lengthy conversation" with Baker and Mondale's
campaign chairman Jim Johnson over the proposal.
According to Wald, the networks were motivated by three factors;
fijn the wake of the new FCC ruling, the networks felt it "incumbent" on
them to try to create such debates; [NJetwork sponsorship would be "less
complicated" because without the League only three parties (the two can
didates and the networks as a unit) would be involved in the debate prep
arations; [NJetwork presentation would create a "direct confrontation" be
tween the candidates, to allow the greatest room for them to expose their
views and differences [the format of the Rather debate].
Ed Leiser, CBS vice president, adds a fourth motivating factor: the League
is "not expert" at the technical work of setting up a debate.^
The networks may also be speculated as having a fifth, more self-inter
ested, motive. In the past, networks have provided gavel-to-gavel coverage
of the parties' nomination conventions, illustrating their concern for public
interest "civics class" broadcasting. Such coverage has declined, however,
as the conventions have become less newsworthy; debate sponsorship of
fers a new avenue for political broadcasting of substantial news and "civics"
value. It would also reestablish network primacy over C-Span and other
stations that have increasingly encroached on convention coverage.
The essence of the network proposal was for a minimum of three debates,
two presidential and one vice presidential. This number was chosen in part
so that the networks could produce one debate each; it is not clear whether
this choice was unwittingly important in the White House negotiations aimed
at whittling down Mondale's plea for six debates. Each debate would be
between sixty and ninety minutes long. Most important, the debates would
follow the Rather format: the two candidates would be alone on the stage
with a single network moderator; there would be no panel of journalists
asking questions.
Meanwhile, the League was pressing ahead with its own sponsorship plans.
It successfully sponsored four debates during the primaries and was plan
ning to raise $1.5 million from institutional and Individual donors. Its army
of volunteers was being mobilized.
Like the networks, the League preferred debates without a panel. How
ever, Reagan staff and, initially, Mondale staff* wanted a panel; like ail de
bate participants, they saw the panel as providing dignity and predictability
to the high-stakes contest. What is not clear is the relative strength with
which the League and the networks were pushing their no-panel wishes.
The candidates finally chose the League as sponsor, and the League agreed
to stage debates with panels. According to Wald, the agreement showed
that the candidates saw the League as malleable; according to Ridings, it
showed that they respected the League as nonpartisan and trustworthy.
Having "won" the debates by agreeing to provide a panel, the League
' Ed Leiser, telephone interview, Nov. 1984.
* That is, immediately after the convention. Ridings confirmed this Mondale stance
at the time with Richard Leone of the Mondale staff. But by Sept. 1, Mondale staffers
were being quoted opting for the "Dan Rather type of debate" by David Hoffman
("At least one debate by Reagan, Mondale agreed to by Aides," Washington Post 1
Sept. 1984: A4).
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found itself under heavy attack from the media, which, like everyone else
except for the candidates, wanted direct confrontation.
In an op-ed column headed "Real Presidential Debates," Washington Post
columnist David Broder asserted:
There is no escaping that every time we [journalists] do that job [of being
panelists] we inject ourselves into the campaign ... and become players, not
observers.... Let the debates be debates.'
A New York Times editorialist chimed in:
There's no need to inject a panel of outsiders; one skilled moderator is all
the provocation that's required.'
Their case seemed to be proved, albeit in an unexpected way, when the
panel selection process broke down completely in the lead-up to the first
debate at Louisville. Some eighty senior journalists whom the League had
suggested as panelists were one after the other blackballed by the candi
dates for reasons that have yet to be adequately explained. The selection
process had become another arena of psychological warfare between the
candidates' staffs. The scandal led the Washington Post's front page on the
day of the debate, moderator Barbara Walters criticized it in her opening
remarks, and both the New York Times and CBS decided to refuse their
journalists permission to serve on future panels.'
It should be clear that, coming on top of the third-candidacy problem
raised by the Anderson debate in 1980, such "debate debates" weakened
the League's sponsorship role and weaken the debates.
Two points need to be made. First, the 1984 "debate debate" underlined
again the fact that the League lacks negotiating weight. This does not imply
that the League lacks dedication (it does not) or that a debate will always be
organized smoothly and to everyone's satisfaction. But it is true nevertheless
that on any dispute over the debate with other parties—networks or can
didates—the League is unlikely to win. Network advice is dominant in all
technical matters, while candidates have been able to dictate terms covering
the number, content, and format of debates, even to the detriment of the
debates themselves. Former FCC chairman Newton Minow comments: ,
The public Is not well served when debates are negotiated In the heat of a
campaign at the last minute with the candidates' tactical advantage taking
precedence over the public interest The debates should not be left to
chance as they are now."
Ridings points out that in 1984 the League did insist on the time frame
for the debates: it told the candidates it would not serve as sponsor if they
agreed to hold only one debate or if the debates were scheduled before
' Washington Post 5 Sept. 1984.
' "If not Debate, at Least Debates," editorial. New York Tiines 23 Sept. 1984: E22.
' James R. Dickenson, "Camps Disagree Over Reporters for Debate Panel," Wash
ington Post 7 Oct. 1984: A1. The Washington Post already had a standing policy on
nonparticipation in the debates (Eleanor Randolph, "Journalists Deplore 'Blackballing'
of Prospective Debate Panelists," Washington Post 8 Oct. 1984: A16).
' Newton Minow, address. Speech Communication Association annual meeting,
Chicago, 2 Nov. 1984.
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the third-to-last week or after the last week of the campaign. Yet on no key
feature of the 1984 debates did the League "lay down the law" and thus
require other parties to accede to a ruling. Where disputes emerged, such
as over the panel selection, the League was unable to prevent the candidates
from eroding the integrity of its own debate structure.
This inability existed despite the rationale for League sponsorship: that it
is an impartial community organization that can represent and defend the
public interest. The League's effective role appears to be limited to that of
the well-meaning but impotent honest broker.
Second, the League's weaknesses are highlighted by the networks' grow
ing eagerness to sponsor debates. The rivalry between the networks and
the League should not be underrated. With the progressive liberalization
of Section 315, the networks are likely to feel the dispute is shifting favorably
their way. As former CBS chairman Frank Stanton said, "I don't see any need
for the League. We didn't have it in I960."' In any case, future candidates
may simply prefer network sponsorship. Debate advocates must determine
whether this is any cause for alarm.
Perhaps it is not. After all, we rely on network coverage for most of our
political news; debates would hardly exist were it not for a mass television
audience; the networks' primary debates of 1984 were of good quality; and
the networks have not abused the mass debate audience for commercial
gain.
Yet there are three areas for concern about network debate sponsorship
that remain problematic:
1) Could network news reporters cover the "debate debate" with tough
ness and impartiality when their own corporate executives were in
volved?
2} Would network sponsorship lead to debates better characterized as
"good TV" (shorter answers, fewer debates, more combative ex
changes) than as "good campaigning" (thoughtful analysis, more de
bates)? And if so, would this be bad?
3) Would network sponsorship place further obstacles between voters
and candidates? If League sponsorship implies candidate response to
a citizens group, would network sponsorship imply that the candidates
are "brought to you" by them?
Suitable debate sponsors would seem to require three characteristics:
resources to mount the events, reputation to win the confidence of other
parties and the public, and—most important in the context of this paper—
rule-making clout to impose conditions conducive to a satisfactory debate.
The League lacks the third quality; and networks, if these concerns are valid,
lack the second.
If neither the League nor the networks are satisfactory, other solutions
can be crafted. According to Newton Minow, political parties, which do
meet all three criteria, should become the sponsors. He believes the Re
publican and Democratic parties should, during their nominating conven
tions, commit their candidates in advance to a series of debates. (He suggests
"Kennedy-Nixon debate organizers take critical view," Broadcast/ng 15 Oct. 1984: 36.
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four debates, including one by the vice presidential candidates.) The de
bates should be televised live from the floor of Congress; they should be
witnessed by an audience of congressmembers and senators, without the
mediation of a panel of questioners.
Alternatively, a custom-built agency—a Presidential Debates Commis
sion—has been suggested.^" Such a commission, jointly chaired by former
debate participants, could also meet all three criteria above. It would have
the advantage of absorbing rather than elbowing aside the League, which,
for all its other drawbacks, still has an undisputed public reputation for
probity. Drawing on the expertise of the League, the Twentieth Century
Fund, and other capable organizations, a commission could also be well
placed to conduct much-needed research on alternative debate formats
and on education to win public support for debates.
However, a commission could realistically be established as sponsor only
if the League, the networks, and the political parties chose to cooperate.
Methods of funding it and making it administratively flexible remain to be
worked out.
The sponsorship question needs urgent resolution through public debate
by politicians, journalists, scholars, and foundations involved in public af
fairs. Once chosen, any new sponsor will need substantial lead time—at
least two years—to develop new proposals for the content and format of
the 1988 debates.
Content and Format: Better
Than Nothing
The debates are intended to educate the public about the issues in the
campaign and the candidates' positions on the issues, as well as to stimulate
voter interest and participation in the election. [Mrs. Dorothy Ridings]"
You can say anything you want during a debate, and 80 million people see
it. (If reporters then document that a candidate spoke untruthfully) so what?
... Maybe 200 people read it, or 2,000 or 20,000. [Mr. Peter Teeley, press
secretary to Vice President George Bush]"
if Mrs. Ridings is right and educating the voters is what the 1984 debates
were about, how well did Reagan, Bush, Mondale, and Ferraro make use of
their 280-minute exposure to their largest campaign audiences?
The answer is: not very well. A brief survey of the content of the three
debates indicates that any voter relying on the debates for political educa
tion would have been misinformed. The record of the debates shows that
key issues were omitted. Trivial and transitory issues were exaggerated. Errors
abounded unchecked.
For instance, debate on issues regarding the Middle East, an area of par
amount importance in American foreign policy, was limited almost exclu-
" Charles Benton, "Let Ex-Presidents Make Debate Rules," letter to the editor.
New York Times 29 Nov. 1984: A30.
" League of Women Voters, news release, 17 Sept. 1984.
" Reported in the New York Times 19 Oct. 1984 and in the Washington Post, edi
torial, 20 Oct. 1984.
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sively to the Beirut terror bombings. There was no mention of current US
policy toward the region as a whole—no appraisal of President Reagan's
1902 Peace Plan or of Democratic alternatives to it. There was no discussion
of specific concerns outside Lebanon: the Iran-Iraq war, the new Israeli
government, ties with Egypt and Jordan.
Similarly, debate concerning Central America was limited almost exclu
sively to the CIA guerrilla manual, with little mention of the candidates'
different and similar views on more long-term regional problems.
The Louisville debate, allegedly on domestic policy, failed to cover sub-
stantively the topics of ERA, education, civil rights, and the environment.
Mondale skimmed past his tax-increase plans in the same way that, two
weeks later, both he and the president skated over specific ways of talking
arms control with the Soviets.
Most extraordinary, one of the sharpest foreign policy differences to
emerge was over whether nonexistent "Star Wars" technology should be
handed over to the Soviets in the remote event that it is ever perfected by
the US.
If these imbalances and omissions were a hindrance to voter education,
then so too was the proliferation of errors and misstatements. President
Reagan's inaccurate depiction of the opponents of the Marcos regime in
the Philippines was corrected politely but rapidly by the State Department
after the debate. Reagan's statement about his refusal to risk innocent lives
in retaliating against terrorists was undermined later in the week by the
secretary of state himself in his "Hamlet" speech. The president's firm guar
antee that current Social Security recipients would not have their benefits
cut was modified in the following days to include future beneficiaries.
Mondale seemed to promise the "total repeal" of tax indexing after eco
nomic recovery; a month earlier he had declared his support for indexing.
In the debate this contradiction went unchallenged, as did Reagan's baffling
claim that fixed-Income earners on $8,000 "in 1979 or 1980" were $500
above the poverty line and "in 1980" were $500 below the line.
In other words, issues that were addressed were often incorrectly ad
dressed; viewers had no way of distinguishing the accurate from the mis
stated.
The running mates were similarly astray. Bush declared that "the experts"
would support his assertion that funding for certain domestic programs had
been increased; it had not. Ferraro declared that as president, Mondale
would challenge the Russians to a ban on atmospheric nuclear testing; such
a ban was instituted in 1963 and remains in force.
Most of these flaws were duly reported in the days following the de
bates. But as Teeley recognizes, these corrections drew small audiences.
What attracted greater coverage were different "issues": the issue of the
president's age; the issue of his one-liner at Kansas City, which disposed of
the age issue; the issue of whether Ferraro had been patronized; the Issue
of Mondale's pal response to "There you go again"; and so on.
" For example, David Hoffman, "Candidates Cast Versions of Truth," Washington
Post 9 Oct. 1984: A6; Lou Cannon, "Star Wars Descriptions Were Off Target," Wash
ington Post 23 Oct. 1984; A7.
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In addition to having these content problems, debates have been dogged
by misperceptions created by format problems.
One of the enduring if not endearing features of debate commentary is
the boxing metaphor. From the 1858 cartoon depicting Lincoln and Douglas
squaring off in a "political prize fight"" to "fighting Fritz" jetting about the
campaign trail in a plane nicknamed "The Louisville Slugger," the metaphor
seems to fit the debates like a (boxing) glove. A poster issued for the third
debate summed it up without embarrassment: "Kansas City welcomes you
to a celebration of American democracy" read the caption under a picture
of two boxing gloves, labeled Reagan and Mondale, hanging from a micro
phone.
Debates are not about issues alone. They are also about people, candi
dates, in conflict. As the New York Times editorialized, they are not only
about the words but are also about the "music."" We need to know not
only what is said but also who is saying it.
The boxing metaphor sums this up: we see the candidates, like boxers,
alone, under equal conditions, and in confrontation. This format has dom
inated all televised debates since 1960. But how good is the format? i believe
the debates and the electoral process have suffered as a result of this way
of thinking about them and staging them.
Like boxers, debaters are alone, unassisted by their media consultants and
press secretaries. Theodore White was mostly right in his famous judgment
on the 1960 debate: through instinct and emotion voters do learn much
about the style and patterns of behavior of the candidates under stress."
But the drawback is that we also see them without policy advisors. Thus,
White is wrong in this respect: the stress of debating is different from the
stress of decision making in the Oval Office. Debating requires brevity,
consistency, extensive briefing, and constant rebuttal of the opponent. Gov
erning requires more time, perhaps some inconsistency, improvisation, and
compromise with opponents. In particular, governing requires skillful man
agement of a team of advisors. Debating, in contrast, focuses on the presi
dential candidates in isolation.
Second, like boxers, debaters are equalized. A good element of debates
is that we see the candidates under identical conditions: equal time for
answers and rebuttals, symmetrical handshakes and photo opportunities with
the family. But the downfall here is that the equality is illusory, the result
of the democratic myth that each election starts tabula rasa. The candidates
in 1984 were not equal; one of them was the president of the United States.
Debates, like election campaigns, have an inbuilt disequilibrium; in 1984 the
debate imbalance against the incumbent president was such that one ninety-
minute debate at Louisville nearly upset his reelection chances.
Incidentally, abolishing panels would reduce this illusion of equality. The
League's original intention" was that panelists would ask the "same" ques
tion to both candidates; in practice this is impossible.
" Reprinted in the Washington Post 8 Oct. 1984: A27.
" New York Times footnote 6. See also David Broder, Washington Post 3 Oct. 1984;
Congressional Quarterly 13 Oct. 1984: 2625.
"Theodore H. White, "Round Two: The Television Debates," Chapter 11 of The
Making of the President, 1960 (New York: Athenaeum, 1961).
" League of Women Voters, news release, 17 Sept. 1984.
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Third, like boxing, debates are about confrontation. We see candidates
face to face; the air crackles when they challenge each other. Each side is
looking to place the knockout blow; every word is part of a victory strategy.
But as before, there is a drawback here. Having put the candidates in a ring,
we fee! compelled to declare one of them a winner.'®
How do we determine who wins? The pressures of news and politics to
declare a winner overlook the distinct possibility that debating may not
always produce one. Winners are declared even though political commen
tators, unlike boxing judges, lack objective scoring criteria for making that
decision. While boxers are rated only on performance, debaters must be
appraised on performance and substance. Journalists resort to counting errors
and one-liners, guided by the subtle analyses of the "spin doctors."" They
frequently shirk judging the substantive content of debates. Yet it is pre
cisely this kind of judgment that voters must make.
Suggested Modifications
Given this balance sheet, most journalists and scholarly observers deliver
the tepid decision that debates are better than nothing—better, anyway,
than nondebate forms of campaign communication. Television advertise
ments are disparaged as costly, slick, and misleading; television news re
porting likens a campaign to a horse race, unable to convey complicated
ideas; newspaper reporting may be more substantive but is less read. Can
didates conduct ever more structured campaigns aimed solely at manipu
lating television news coverage. This tactic was especially evident last year
in the White House decisions to hold no press conferences, to adhere to
prepared texts, and to minimize second-term promises.
So debates are seen as the only way to get to the candidates on other
than their own terms, the only way to introduce uncertainty into their
schedules.
Paradoxically, debates also allow the candidates their best opportunities
for speaking to the voters without mediation and at length. Additionally,
debates make issues palatable to mass audiences. Debates are important to
many voters. According to exit poll data released by ABC News, twenty
percent of voters said the presidential debate was "very important" to them
in making their voting decision, while eight percent said the vice presiden
tial debate had been very important.^"
The most obvious option for generating greater enthusiasm about debates
is to have more of them. If each debate became less of a do-or-die effort.
'* Time and Newsweek had identical covers, featuring the question "Who Won?"
" "Spin doctors" are the candidate staffers who invade the press room after debates
to put a favorable "spin" on press coverage with their interpretations {"The Debate
and the Spin Doctors," editorial. New York Times 21 Oct. 1984: E22). Richard Wirthlin,
the Reagan-Bush ultra-computerized pollster, is developing what could be called
objective criteria. He tested the positive and negative reactions of a focus group of
forty debate viewers at Kansas City by wiring them electronically (Hedrlck Smith,
"Aftermath of Debate," New York Times 24 Oct. 1984: A23).
•° This matches post-debate poll data by CBS/New York Times, which showed that
seventy-two percent said the first debate did not affect their opinion of Reagan and
that forty-six percent said it did not affect their opinion of Mondale. Howell Raines,
"Debates Shift the Focus and Perhaps the Odds," New York Times 14 Oct. 1984: El.
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candidates might relax more, and different formats could be tried. The last
time two non-incumbents debated—Kennedy and Nixon in 1960—four de
bates were held. A good case could be made for repeating the dose in 1988
on the grounds that non-incumbents will need the greater exposure to a
nation unfamiliar with them.
However, unless the content of the debates is also improved, increasing
the number of them is insufficient. 1 believe the debate sponsor should
specify topics of discussion in advance with greater precision than they are now
specified.
Instead of stating that a debate will cover a broad topic such as domestic
or foreign policy, the sponsoring organization should determine—perhaps
after consulting the public, the candidates, and public opinion polls—three
specific topics for debate within this broad topic. For example, the 1984
foreign policy debate could have focused on the Middle East, Central Amer
ica, and superpower relations.
Under this format, candidates would be informed that debate on each of
the three topics would last twenty minutes, totaling two-thirds of a ninety-
minute debate. Each topic would be introduced by the moderator with a
brief, two- to three-minute, outline of existing policy and recent events.
For last year's topic of the Middle East, this introduction could have sum
marized Camp David, the Reagan Peace Plan, and the Beirut bombings. Each
candidate would speak for five minutes on the topic and then spend the
final seven minutes on argument and rebuttal.
The intention of this part of the debate would be to have candidates
address a minimum number of key issues in a comprehensive fashion. Im
plicit in this approach is an important second benefit: it offers the chance
of abolishing panels of questioners. Only the candidates seem to want panels;
everyone else agrees that they have turned debates into joint press confer
ences.^^ Candidates must be induced to sacrifice them, in exchange they
should be offered, as they are in this proposal, other means of gaining some
of the predictability they see panels as providing. This proposal suggests
that candidates would know in advance the subject matter of two-thirds of
the debate and could brief themselves accordingly. If panels were abolished,
the final one-third of the debate could be used for a general discussion of
other topics that the candidates themselves raise—a "real debate"—with
only peacekeeping and timekeeping necessitating a moderator between the
candidates.
Third, why not allow some policy advisors to join the candidates on the
stage and to contribute occasionally to their leaders' arguments? One of
the most striking features of Ferraro's lengthy press conference on her fam
ily finances was her willingness to seek technical information from her ac
countants seated to one side. The presence of advisors on the stage of a
debate would pose television production problems, but not insuperable
With some exceptions. Sawyer's question on abortion prompted a useful discus
sion that probably would not have taken place otherwise. Candidates sometimes
tacitly conspire to avoid dangerous waters by avoiding asking each other the toughest
questions, as the Democratic primary debaters realized.
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ones. More important, it would remind viewers that while they are voting
only for elected officials, they are governed in large part by appointees.
Finally, more work needs to be done in developing alternative formats.
Nelson Polsby has, for example, proposed a system of paired conversations
in which first one candidate and then the other would speak and respond
for ninety minutes to an expert nonjournaiist panel made up of two sup
porters and two critics. If the topic were economics, half the panelists (all
economic commentators) would be selected by the candidate and the other
half by his opponent. Talks could be held on successive weeks on different
topics."
Like many alternative formats, this one runs the risk of becoming simply
a modified "Meet the Press." It also lacks the spark of one-to-one confron
tation; it is doubtful whether such seminars would attract very large audi
ences.
However, options do exist for improving presidential debates. The essen
tial need is for a sponsor to emerge soon and to commence the long task
of researching possible debate rules and leading a public debate on them.
Previous experiences with debates have led to a sort of resignation among
debate advocates that they are doomed to mediocrity because the candi
dates will always win out in the preliminary haggling over format. This at
titude is, of course, self-defeating. Some imaginative thinking about the
1988 debates before the candidates are selected can perhaps turn the tables
on them by presenting them with a format they may be unable to refuse.
" "Debatable Thoughts on Presidential Debates," The Past and future of Pres/dentiai
Debates, ed. Austin Ranney (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1979) 175-
86.
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